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The oil crisis of the 1970s left an indelible mark on United States
history and American culture.1  Beginning in October of 1973, retail
gasoline prices climbed by more than forty percent in a matter of
months, resulting in daily price increases.2  “Gas lines”3 wound into
the streets, allowing motorists to fuel their tanks, and often only for a
limited purchase.4  In some parts of the country, gas stations ran out
of fuel.5  Prices made gas unaffordable, forcing millions of Americans

1. See generally Energy Information Administration, World Oil Market and Oil Price
Chronologies:  1970–2000 (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
cabs/chron.html (providing pertinent information regarding the status of the
world’s oil market and prices during the years 1970-2000); Barbara Rudolph, Enjoy
Now, Pay Later; As Oil Imports Rise and Output Falls, the U.S. May Face a Future Shock, 129
TIME MAG., Mar. 16, 1987, at 54, available at 1987 WL 2364550 (pointing out the oil
price-shocks of the early 1970s and Americans’ reliance on gas for their cars and
home heating).
2. See generally STEPHEN G. RABE, THE ROAD TO OPEC: UNITED STATES RELATIONS
WITH VENEZUELA, 1919-1976 180-82 (1982) (discussing the effect of the 1970s oil
embargo on gasoline prices); see also DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE 616 (1991)
(“American motorists saw retail gasoline prices climb by more than 40 percent . . .
[and n]o other price change had such visible, immediate, and visceral effects as that
of gasoline.”).
3. See YERGIN, supra note 2, at 616-17 (detailing the desperation of Americans to
keep their automobiles supplied with gasoline, even if it was with the most minimal
amount); see also 146 CONG. REC. S1942 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (“[In 1974 p]eople lined up for three blocks waiting in a gas line to get
some fuel.  By the time you got there, the pumps sometimes were out or sometimes it
was limited.”).
4. See YERGIN, supra note 2, at 617.
5. See id. (noting that many gas stations throughout the United States were
supplied with enough gasoline to service only a limited number of motorists, and
many “sprouted ‘Sorry, No Gas Today’ signs”).
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to limit usage of their automobiles.6  Similarly, many were unable to
afford their severe home heating bills.7  While a crisis as grim as the
one felt in the early- to mid-1970s is unlikely to occur in the near
future,8 America has recently witnessed dramatic oil price inflation.9
The member countries of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (“OPEC”)10 took collaborative actions beginning
in March 1999, to reduce oil production thereby depriving the
market of four million barrels a day amounting to approximately six
percent of the global oil supply.11  Historically, OPEC, in its capacity
as an international conglomerate,12 used its power to substantially
inflate the price of oil.13  More recently, the world has seen prices
escalate from nearly eleven dollars per barrel in December 1998, to
over thirty-seven dollars per barrel by October 2000.14

6. See id. at 617 (depicting the strife with which Americans dealt on a daily basis
regarding the inflated gasoline prices of the early 1970s).
7. See Mark T.L. Sargent, Comment, Economics Upside-Down: Low-Price Guarantees
As Mechanisms For Facilitating Tacit Collusion, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2063 (1993)
(describing how American consumers adapted to the increased oil prices during the
1970s by driving smaller cars, improving insulation in homes, and turning to
alternative energy sources).
8. See Reuters, 40 Years Later, OPEC has World Running on Empty (Sept. 6, 2000),
available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/09/06/energy.opec.anniv
.reut (asserting that while the United States is fearful that another “1970’s-style”
recession might occur, not only is this type of recession unlikely, but “the world is far
better prepared to manage another OPEC crisis than in the ‘70s”).
9. See id. (discussing the oil production reductions and price increases that
OPEC has made beginning in 1998); see also infra text accompanying notes 10-14
(providing an overview of OPEC’s recent efforts at unilaterally effecting the price of
oil on a global scale).
10. See infra Part I (discussing the formation, history, and objectives of OPEC).
11. See also Oil Price Reduction Act of 2000, H.R. 3822, 106th Cong. § 2(4)
(2000) (“[A]rtificial supply constraints placed on the market are ultimately self-
defeating in so far as they increase volatility in the market, lead to boom and bust
cycles, and promote global instability, particularly in developing countries . . . .”); see
infra Part I.B (asserting that OPEC cut back oil production and increased oil prices
again beginning in 1999).
12. See JOHN EVANS, OPEC, ITS MEMBER STATES AND THE WORLD ENERGY MARKET
129 (1986) (stating that a 1960 treaty established OPEC as a permanent inter-
governmental organization and the United Nations Economic and Social Council
subsequently recognized OPEC as such).
13. See LORING ALLEN, OPEC OIL xi-xiv (1979) (explaining that OPEC always has
used its power to control substantially the prices of oil in the world market).
14. Practically speaking, $37.00 per barrel translates to just under $1.60 per
gallon. See Motor Gasoline Price Survey, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/rtlgas.txt
(last visited Oct. 31, 2000) (providing current U.S. retail gasoline price statistics); see,
e.g., Liz Cho, Woes at the Pump: Gas Prices Hurting Midwest Business (June 18, 2000),
available at http://go3.163.com/~cifco/news/news062002.htm (last visited Apr. 9,
2001) (explaining that the Midwest is feeling the effects of OPEC more than
anywhere else in the United States).  In June 2000, gas prices were well over $2.00
per gallon in Chicago, reaching an all-time high. See id.  These price hikes hurt
businesses, especially those that require long-distance transportation.  See id.  See also
H.R. 3822 § 2(5) (stating that gas prices in the year 2000 are the highest they have
been since the Persian Gulf War); Jodie T. Allen, et al., No, It’s Not the 70’s Relax.
Rising Oil Prices Aren’t Likely to Derail the Economy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 25,
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OPEC’s past and current control of a significant portion of the
world’s oil, is nothing less than “reprehensible.”15  OPEC’s operations,
if conducted within the United States, would constitute a criminal
conspiracy in restraint of trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act
(“Sherman Act”).16  U.S. antitrust laws, most notably the Sherman Act,
prohibit anti-competitive restraints of trade, monopolies, and price
discrimination, all of which result in either driving competitors out of
business or raising “prices to a level that will enable the predator to
recover its losses and, in the long run, earn additional profits.”17
Accordingly, OPEC’s policies essentially force American motorists to
incur substantially higher gasoline prices, while OPEC’s revenue
continues to soar.18  To date, U.S. courts are reluctant to alter or
restructure current laws that would facilitate a suit against OPEC in a
U.S. court.
This Comment argues that OPEC’s actions, with respect to its
members’ collusive oil-production level-setting and price-fixing
activities, are in violation of U.S. antitrust laws, and that in order to
issue an injunction to halt the increase in gas prices, outdated
notions of OPEC’s sovereign immunity must be abandoned.  OPEC’s
activities directly effect the United States.  While previously
unsuccessful, the United States should consider legal action against
OPEC with a new approach and new analysis of the underlying legal
doctrines.  The United States has historically evaded assertions of
extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns.19  This
Comment will demonstrate that the blanket of sovereign immunity
does not shield OPEC’s actions, and that the United States should
address the matter judicially, by bringing an antitrust suit against

2000, at 1-2, available at 2000 WL 7718795 (providing a commentary on the recent
increase in oil prices as well as where the blame lies for such an increase).
15. See 146 CONG. REC. S1942 (characterizing OPEC’s behavior as effectuating a
restraint of trade thereby justifying filing an antitrust suit against OPEC).
16. “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal.”  15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  See infra note 70
(providing an in-depth analysis of the Sherman Act).
17. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 251
(1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the purpose of all three antitrust
statutes is to prohibit the practice of selling below cost to adversely affect
competitors).
18. See Press Release, House International Relations Committee, “Oil Producers
in Clover While Our Consumers are in Hock,” Gilman Tells Richardson, available at
www.house.gov/international_relations/press/106sec/62prjun27.html (June 27,
2000) (discussing oil producers’ multi-billion dollar profits following OPEC’s price
increases, as well as the effect of such an increase on Americans).
19. See infra notes 60-165 and accompanying text (providing a historical analysis
of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law).
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OPEC.20  In support of this conclusion, this Comment will show that
OPEC’s actions are patently commercial in nature, thereby
undermining the classic defense of sovereign immunity.21
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of OPEC’s role as a
cartel in world oil production, focusing on its price-fixing tendencies
in both the past and present.22  Part II explores current U.S. antitrust
laws and their extraterritorial application, while considering the
issues of foreign response and international comity.23  Part III
discusses the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its codification
under The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,24 highlighting the
exceptions that strip sovereigns of their immunity.25  Part IV identifies
prior rulings of litigation brought against OPEC, the defects inherent
in those decisions, and how, with a proper reading of the applicable
doctrines, coupled with recent legislation, the United States can and
should assert jurisdiction over OPEC and its member nations.26  This
Comment concludes that, in conjunction with overcoming the
various jurisprudential obstacles preventing antitrust jurisdiction over
OPEC, U.S. courts will be able to issue an injunction thereby
precluding OPEC’s continued oil price-fixing and reversing the gas
price increase.

20. See infra Part IV.B (discussing why OPEC should not retain its sovereign
immunity status).
21. See infra notes 245-55 (explaining why OPEC’s activities and practices should
be categorized as commercial in nature).
22. See infra Part I (evaluating OPEC’s role as an international cartel in the global
oil market).
23. See infra Part II (explaining existing antitrust statutes in the United States);
infra Part IV.D (recounting past and present readings of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law and the consequences that ensued therefrom).
24. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, its use
as a defense to antitrust allegations, and the relevant exceptions).
25. See infra Part III (outlining the limitations on extraterritorial antitrust
jurisdiction based on sovereign interests and exceptions attached thereto).
26. See infra Part IV (explaining why the United States should file an antitrust suit
against OPEC).
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I. OPEC AND ITS HISTORY
OPEC is an intergovernmental organization dedicated to
maintaining the stability and prosperity of the petroleum market.27
Formed in September 1960,28 eleven member countries29 currently
comprise OPEC and represent the world’s major producers and
exporters of crude petroleum.30  OPEC’s objective is to coordinate
and unify the petroleum policies of its member countries.31  It
purports to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers,
produce an efficient, economic, and regular supply of petroleum to
consuming nations, and provide a fair return on capital to those
investing in the industry.32
OPEC is not, however, a commercial entity as it does not itself
conduct business transactions.33  “OPEC aims to coordinate the
[output and] production policies of its Member Countries through
consensus decision making.”34  Accordingly, OPEC’s member

27. See OPEC Online: About OPEC, available at http://www.opec.org/About_
OPEC/About_OPEC.htm (last visited May 26, 2001) (providing an overview of the
functions OPEC serves).
28. See HORST MENDERSHAUSEN, COPING WITH THE OIL CRISIS: FRENCH AND
GERMAN EXPERIENCES 12-13 (1976) (offering a history leading up to the formation of
OPEC).  Five founding members including Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and
Venezuela, formed OPEC at the Baghdad Conference on September 10-14, 1960.  See
id. at 13. The five oil-exporting countries created OPEC “as a direct response to the
challenge posed by the multinational oil companies in arbitrarily and unilaterally
reducing the posted prices of crude oil in February 1959 and again in August 1960.”
See id. at 12.
29. See OPEC Online: Member Countries, available at  http://www.opec.org
/Member_Counrties/Member_Countries.htm (last visited May 20, 2001) (stating
that OPEC’s eleven member countries currently include: Algeria, Libya, Nigeria,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and
Venezuela).
30. See ALLEN, supra note 13, at xi (discussing how OPEC’s dominance over the
world oil market has “worsened inflation and recession and forced oil-consuming
countries to make unwanted changes, while greatly enhancing its members’ welfare
and prospects of development”).
31. See OPEC Online: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About OPEC, available at
http://www.opec.org/FAQs/AnswersAboutOPEC.htm (last visited May 26, 2001)
(elucidating the goal and purpose for which OPEC was formed).
32. See OPEC Online: About OPEC—OPEC History, available at http://www.opec.
org/About_OPEC/History.htm (last visited May 26, 2001) (recounting OPEC’s
objectives as set out in the OPEC statute).
33. See MANA SAEED AL-OTAIBA, OPEC AND THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 65 (1975)
(explaining OPEC’s status as a permanent organization with international status and
noting that OPEC is not a commercial establishment); see also International Uranium
Cartel, 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 226 (1977) (statement
of Jerry McAfee, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Gulf Oil Corp.) (noting
that OPEC’s member countries’ governments assist OPEC in enforcing compliance
with price and output guidelines).
34. OPEC Online: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About OPEC, available at
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countries maintain absolute sovereignty over their respective oil
production.35  Each member country undertakes the production of
oil through its national oil company (“NOC”).36  Correspondingly,
each member country’s government completely owns its NOC and
considers its NOC as an “agent or instrumentality”37 of that member
country.38
A. OPEC:  The Most Powerful Cartel in the World
A “cartel” is an association of producers and/or consumers of a
certain product, formed for the purpose of manipulating the
product’s price in a given market.39  Cartels use a variety of means to
affect prices; the most effective is to coordinate limits on production
by each member so as to lower the supply, relative to the demand of
the good.40  OPEC is widely known as the most prominent cartel in

http://www.opec.org/FAQs/AnswersAboutOPEC.htm (last visited May 26, 2001).
See generally AL-OTAIBA, supra note 33, at 107 (discussing OPEC’s objectives upon
formation to stabilize prices and prevent harmful fluctuations).
35. See OPEC Online: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About OPEC, available at
http://www.opec.org/FAQs/AnswersAboutOPEC.htm (last visited May 26, 2001)
(providing information with respect to the control that each OPEC member-nation
has over its respective rates of oil production).
36. See COBY VAN DER LINDE, THE STATE AND THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKET 12-16
(2000) (explaining that each member country determines whether it maintains
exclusive state ownership of its NOCs). The government-owned oil companies that
exist under the OPEC umbrella include Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia), Pertamina
(Indonesia), Sonatrach (Algeria), Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (Kuwait), Qatar
General Petroleum Corporation (Qatar), Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (Venezuela),
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Nigeria), Iraq National Oil Company
(Iraq), Abu Dahbi National Oil Company (United Arab Emirates), National Iranian
Oil Company (Iran), and Lybian National Oil Company (the Socialist People’s
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya). See OPEC Online: Member Countries, available at
http://www.opec.org/Member_Counrties/Member_Countries.htm (last visited May
27, 2001).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (“An ‘agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state’ means any entity—(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate
or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a
foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a
state of the United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor
created under the laws of any third country.”).
38. See generally VAN DER LINDE, supra note 36, at 97-126 (providing an overview of
the ways by which oil producing countries’ NOC function).
39. See HEINRICH KRONSTEIN, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 41 (1973)
(defining a cartel “as a coordination of the economic behavior of independent
partners, based on their consent, which results in regulation of [a particular
market]”); see also Sidney Weintraub, The Example of OPEC and the Possibility of Other
Producer Cartels, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (1975) (asserting that a cartel requires
certain conditions to manipulate effectively the market, including low price elasticity
of demand and supply limits from non-cartel producers); JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 251 (4th ed. 1988) (defining a cartel as an agreement
among producers to raise their prices above the competitive level by lowering
production).
40. See JAMIE R. MARQUEZ, OIL PRICE EFFECTS AND OPEC’S PRICING POLICY: AN
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the international economy;41 it is a multi-national alliance, whose
members act collusively with the objectives of creating productive
ineffectiveness and augmenting prices, thereby harming the
countries it serves by siphoning those countries’ wealth.42
OPEC is essentially “[a] cooperation among governments to
control the operations of an industry they own or control through
dominance of price and supply.”43  In the mid-1970s OPEC supplied
84% of the world’s total oil exports and owned nearly 70% of the
world’s oil reserves.44  This number continued to grow well into the
1980s.45  The high oil prices led to the expansion of supplies from
non-OPEC producers.46  Nevertheless, the Energy Information
Administration (“EIA”)47 estimates that OPEC’s eleven members
account for approximately “40% of world oil production and about
77% of the world’s proven oil reserves.”48 Although to a lesser extent
than a quarter-century ago, OPEC remains the dominant force in the

OPTIMAL CONTROL APPROACH 1 (1984) (asserting that the effects of oil price
augmentation by the economies of oil importing countries stem from both the
demand and supply side).  “Taking into account both demand and supply responses,
an increase in the price of oil results . . . in a decrease in real income and an increase
in inflation of oil importers.” Id.
41. See id. at 2 (assessing the power and influence OPEC can exert on the oil
industry).
42. See FREDERIC SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 23-27 (3d ed. 1990) (finding that the inefficiency of
allocation is attributable to the diversion of resources from the cartel market as well
as quotas on production levels).
43. ALLEN, supra note 13, at 126.
44. Id. at xi.
45. See Carol A. Dahl, U.S. and World Oil Production and Production Costs in the
1980s, in AFTER THE OIL PRICE COLLAPSE: OPEC, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE WORLD
OIL MARKET 109-10 (Wilfred L. Kohl ed., 1991) (discussing OPEC’s dominance of the
world oil market extending from the early to mid-1970s well into the 1980s).
46. See Energy Information Administration, Non-OPEC Fact Sheet, at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nonopec.html (last modified June 19, 2000)
(providing a comparison of the oil industries in non-OPEC countries to those in
OPEC countries). Though they help only one-fourth of the proven oil reserves
globally, non-OPEC countries supply approximately 58% of the world’s crude oil. Id.
Seven countries, which are Canada, the United Kingdom, Mexico, Norway, China,
the United States, and Russia, dominate non-OPEC production.  Id.  They hold 67%
of non-OPEC proven oil reserves and generate approximately 68% of non-OPEC oil.
Id.
47. See Energy Information Administration, About Us, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/
neic/aboutEIA/aboutus.htm (last modified Oct. 8, 2000) (explaining that Congress
established the EIA in 1977, to serve as a statistical agency of the U.S. Department of
Energy, and to “provide policy-independent data, forecasts, and analyses to promote
sound policy making, efficient markets, and public understanding regarding energy
and its interaction with the economy and the environment”).
48. Energy Information Administration, OPEC Fact Sheet: Background, at
http://eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/opec.htm (last modified May 7, 2001) (providing
OPEC’s oil pricing trends and production and reserve levels).  Total world oil supply
includes crude oil, natural gas liquids, and refinery gain.  Id.
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oil market.49
B. OPEC’s Impact on the Oil Industry
OPEC is not a monopoly, as it does not seek to drive other
competitors out of the market.50 Yet, OPEC does produce
approximately 40% of the world’s oil supply and exports about 55%
of internationally traded oil.51  The OPEC statute, written at OPEC’s
inception, declares OPEC’s dedication to subsidizing the petroleum
market, providing steady supplies to consumers and fair returns to
investors in the oil industry.52  Despite this proclamation, the world
has seen its share of “energy crises,” with OPEC at the helm.53
Throughout the last three decades, the world has witnessed several
periods of unrest in the Middle East in part resulting in nightmarishly
high oil prices.54 In each occasion, OPEC proved to be a fundamental

49. Compare text accompanying notes 44 and 45, with text accompanying note 47
(providing the difference in OPEC’s control of the world oil market in the 1970s and
today).
50. See GEORGE HORWICH & DAVID LEO WEIMER, RESPONDING TO INTERNATIONAL
OIL CRISES 276 (1988) (stating that despite OPEC’s global power, “it lacks the
cohesion to act as a monopolist”).  A monopoly is defined as an entity possessing the
power or ability to control or fix prices in or exclude competition from a given
market.  See EARL W. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER: A GUIDE TO ANTITRUST AND
TRADE REGULATION LAWS FOR BUSINESSMEN 99-100 (1964) (providing an overview of
the concept of monopolization).  While OPEC does control a significant portion of
the world oil market, it does not have monopoly power as it does not seek to exclude
other oil producers and exporters from the oil market.
51. See OPEC Online: How does OPEC oil production affect oil prices?, available at
http://www.opec.org/FAQs/AnswersAboutOPEC.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2001)
(describing the extent of OPEC’s control over the global oil market).
52. See OPEC Statute, approved Jan. 1961, art. 2(b) & (c), available at
http://www.opec.org/Publications/OS/OS.pdf.
53. See WILLIAM R. FREUDENBURG & ROBERT GRAMLING, OIL IN TROUBLED WATERS:
PERCEPTIONS, POLITICS, AND THE BATTLE OVER OFFSHORE DRILLING 22-23 (1994)
(describing the circumstances surrounding OPEC’s cut in oil production and
consequent oil price escalation).
54. In an era beginning in the early 1970s, OPEC showed the world how it could
unilaterally affect the world’s oil market.  On October 5, 1973, Egypt and Syria
invaded Israel, initiating the Arab-Israeli War, also known as the “Yom Kippur War.”
See West Texas Research Group, History and Analysis, available at http://www.wtrg.
com/prices.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2001) (offering a history and analysis of crude
oil).  The United States and many countries in the western world showed strong
support for Israel. Id. In retaliation for the support extended to Israel, the Arab
exporting nations belonging to OPEC imposed an embargo on the nations
extending such support.  See id.  Consequently, OPEC, during a three-month period
lasting betwen October, 1973 and January, 1974, increased the price of oil from
$3.00 to $11.65 per barrel.  See FREUDENBERG & GRAMLING, supra note 53, at 23
(discussing the oil embargo of the early 1970s and its effect on world oil prices); see
also JOHN M. BLAIR, THE CONTROL OF OIL 264 (1976) (explaining that in order to
maintain the higher prices, OPEC’s Arab members declared on October 17, 1973,
that they would reduce production by 5% in October and by an additional 5% in
each subsequent month unless all Israeli forces were withdrawn from occupied Arab
territories and the Palestinians’ rights were restored).  The United States, who
outrightly imported the majority of its petroleum from OPEC, subsequently, suffers
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player.55 Recently, OPEC captured the headlines again setting oil
prices at a ten-year high.56  OPEC, in its capacity as the world’s
superpower in the oil industry, withheld production from the market
and drove up prices nearly 300% from early 1999 to October 2000.57
The actions attributable to this current “crisis” are clear-cut

years of recession, inflation, and unemployment.  See Richard Mably, The Arab
embargo—from oil crisis to OPEC crisis, MIDDLE EAST TIMES, EGYPT ED., Oct. 18, 1998
(comparing the oil crisis of the 1970s to the “oil shock” of today), available at
http://metimes. com/issue98-42/methaus.htm (opinion section) (last visited Mar. 3,
2001).
Between 1974 and 1978, crude oil prices steadily escalated from $12 to $14 dollars
per barrel.  See West Texas Research Group, Oil Price History and Analysis, available at
http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2001) (discussing the state of
world oil prices after the end of the oil embargo of the early 1970s).  However, crude
oil prices increase again between 1978 and 1980 following tumultuous events in Iran
and Iraq. See id. (providing an overview of crude oil prices, the relationship between
prices and world events, and the outlook for the future of the petroleum industry).
During the six months beginning November of 1978, the Iranian Revolution causes
the loss of nearly 2.5 million barrels of oil per day.  See id.  “In 1980, Iraq’s crude oil
production fell 2.7 million barrels per day, and Iran’s production by 600,000 barrels
per day during the Iran/Iraq war.  The combination of these two events results in
crude oil prices more than doubling from $14 in 1978 to $35 per barrel in 1981.” Id.
In 1989-90, Kuwait, instead of cutting production to let Iraq recoup more profits,
pumped more oil than its agreed OPEC quota, driving world prices down.  See
Youssef M. Ibrahim, Iraq Seeks Bigger Role in OPEC, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1990, at D1
(noting that Kuwait exceeded its quota by 400,000 barrels of oil per day).  See also
Jean Manas, Beyond Right and Wrong? Thoughts Induced By A Post-Modernist Critique Of
The Gulf War, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 245, 250 (1995) (estimating that Kuwait’s increases
in oil production cost Iraq seven billion dollars annually in lost revenues).  On
August 2, 1990, Iraqi military forces invaded the neighboring nation of Kuwait. See
Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Army Invades Capital of Kuwait in Fierce Fighting, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1990, at A1 (describing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). Iraq’s President,
Saddam Hussein, apparently wanted to seize control over Kuwait due to its oil
pricing, production, and sales. See id. Kuwait’s unwillingness to raise its oil prices in
the world market may have triggered Iraq to attack.  See Rex J. Zedalis, Burning of the
Kuwaiti Oilfields and the Laws of War, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 711, 712 (1991)
(noting that Kuwait’s oil revenues would help Iraq alleviate its war debt). President
Hussein believed that because Kuwait had been situated historically within Iraq’s
borders, Iraq was entitled to Kuwait’s oil resources and revenues.  See Gerald F. Seib,
The Mideast Conflict: Iraq Can Make Claim to Kuwait, But It’s a Shaky One, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 13, 1990, at A5 (articulating Iraq’s historical claim to portions of Kuwait
considered to be its own).  Consequently, in an effort to drive the price of oil back
up, and combat the low prices set by Kuwait, OPEC significantly cut production,
thereby increasing the demand and the price of oil.  See Manas, supra note 54, at 250;
see also Energy Information Administration, Iraq, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov
cabs/ iraq.html (Sept. 2000) (indicating that Iraqi oil production dropped from 3.5
million barrels per day in July of 1990 to 300,000 barrels per day following the
invasion of Kuwait).
55. See generally supra note 54 (describing the world’s oil crisis dating back to the
early 1970s and OPEC’s role in each).
56. See Revenge of the Old Economy, BUS. WK., Sept. 25, 2000, at 38 (discussing the
increase in gasoline prices since late 1998), available at WL 24485423.
57. See International Energy Fair Pricing Act of 2000, H.R. 4732, 106th Cong.
§ (2)(1) (2000) (explaining OPEC’s cutbacks in oil production and its augmentation
in oil prices).  See generally supra note 14 and accompanying text (providing
information on OPEC’s recent increase of oil prices).
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violations of U.S. antitrust laws, as discussed in the following section.58
OPEC “has upset the world power balance, worsened inflation . . .
and forced [the United States] to make unwanted changes, while
greatly enhancing its members’ welfare and prospects of
development.”59  The approach to reconciling this problem, however,
must be multifaceted.
II.  U.S. ANTITRUST LAW
A. Overview of Existing Law
The term “antitrust” encompasses a set of national policies
originally designed with four general goals:60 (1) to govern big
business;61 (2) to provide efficient performance;62 (3) to ensure fair
business conduct;63 and (4) to protect competitive processes by
restricting market power.64  Antitrust violations65 typically stem from
price discrimination,66 price-fixing,67 unlawful restraints of trade,68 and

58. See infra Parts II.A-D (discussing the history and current application of U.S.
antitrust laws).
59. ALLEN, supra note 13, at xi.
60. See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS 44 (1965) (articulating four goals).
61. See id. at 17-18 (discussing this goal); id. at 49 (reflecting that because big
business power and market power are co-dependent, restraining market control
limits business power); see also ELEANOR M. FOX & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 1 (1989) (explaining that antitrust law increased in
response to big business).
62. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 60, at 11-14 (discussing this goal); id. at 52-
53 (enunciating that “progress and efficiency are the two great historical
achievements of American industry; the simple and obvious aim of public policy in
matters of industrial organization should be to promote more progress and
efficiency”).
63. See id. at 16-17 (discussing this goal); id. at 56 (finding that increasing market
competition yields transactions that are more fair).
64. See id. at 14-16 (discussing this goal); id. at 58-59 (stating the primary policy
goal of antitrust law is to limit undue market power to achieve desirable economic
performance).
65. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 92 (7th ed. 1999) (noting that antitrust
legislation protects trade and commerce against four types of attack).
66. Price discrimination is “[t]he selling of a good or service of given quality and
average cost at different prices to different buyers.”  DAVID N. HYMAN, MODERN
MICROECONOMICS: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS G-3 (3d ed. 1993).  Price
discrimination can be seen in two forms: direct and indirect price discrimination. See
KINTNER, supra note 50, at 64.  “A direct price discrimination is obvious on its face: a
seller charges different prices to different buyers. A indirect price discrimination, on
the other hand, occurs when differing terms or conditions of sale result in a lower
[or higher] price to certain buyers.”  Id.
67. See infra Part II.B (providing a synopsis of the doctrine of price fixing).
68. Restraints of trade are “agreement[s] between or combination[s] of
businesses intended to eliminate competition, create a monopoly, artificially raise
prices, or otherwise adversely affect the free market.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1316
(7th ed. 1999).  There are two types of unlawful restraints of trade: vertical and
horizontal.  See id.  Vertical restraints refer to restraints “imposed by agreement
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monopolies.69
Federal anti-competitive and antitrust legislation begins with the
legislative trio of the Sherman Act,70 the Clayton Act,71 and the
Robinson-Patman Act.72  These statutes proscribe, in part, that “the
predatory practice of deliberately selling below cost to undermine a
competitor, either to drive the competitor out of business or to raise

between firms at different levels of distribution . . . .”  Id.  Horizontal restraints refer
to restraints “imposed by agreement between competitors at the same level of
distribution.”  Id.
69. A monopoly, in its simplest form, refers to the restriction of competition. See,
e.g., A CENTURY OF THE SHERMAN ACT 33 (Jack C. High & Wayne E. Gable eds., 1992).
More specifically, “‘monopoly,’ or ‘monopoly power,’ has been defined as the power
or ability to fix or control prices in or exclude competition from a relevant market.”
KINTNER, supra note 50, at 99-100.
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  John Sherman drafted the
Sherman bill, as it was labeled originally, in 1890 in response to the excesses of the
railroad and oil monopolies of the 19th century.  See generally ALBERT WALKER,
HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2-5 (1910)
(providing a prelude to the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act).  The Sherman
bill was intended to prohibit restraints to free competition among commercial
enterprises by outlawing attempts at monopolization.  See id. at 4-5.  This Comment
will focus primarily on sections 1, 6a, and 7 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Section 1
declares: “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
Section 6a provides in pertinent part: “[s]ections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to
conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import
commerce) with foreign nations unless . . . such conduct has a direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect [on trade or commerce].” 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998) (alteration added).  Section 7 defines “person” or “persons”: “[t]he
word ‘person’, or ‘persons’, wherever used in sections 1 to 7 of this title shall be
deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the
laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any
State, or the laws of any foreign country.” 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
Notably, for Sherman Act analysis, this definition would include OPEC and its
member-nations as each of the oil companies producing OPEC’s oil is under the
direct control of their respective member-nation.
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998).  Congress passed the Clayton Act to repair certain flaws and omissions of
the Sherman Act.  See KINTNER, supra note 50, at 22-23 (finding that while a Sherman
Act violation requires actual and substantive anti-competitive effects, the Clayton Act
needs only a probability of substantially lessening competition, regardless of actual
results).  The Clayton Act was essentially a patchwork repair to the deficiencies of the
Sherman Act.  See id. at 23 (comparing the Clayton and Sherman Acts).  Practically
speaking, both the Clayton and the Sherman Acts, however, seek to prevent price
discrimination, anti-competitive conduct, and monopolization.  Id.  Aside from filling
gaps and omissions in the Sherman Act,  Congress enacted the Clayton Act to deal
with, among other things, mergers, acquisitions, and exclusive dealings.  Thus, for
purposes of this Comment, any reference to the Clayton Act beyond this cursory
comparison to the Sherman Act would be irrelevant and is therefore omitted.
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  See generally RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIFFERENCES 1
(1976) (“The Robinson-Patman Act is a ‘complex’ statute regulating pricing and
other practices in the distribution of goods.”). Congress passed it in an effort to
remove price discrimination and promote fair competition.  Id.  For purposes of this
Comment, discussion of the Robinson-Patman Act is irrelevant and will therefore be
omitted.
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prices to a level that will enable the predator to recover its losses and
‘in the long run’ earn additional profits.”73
Although the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts serve specific
purposes, the Sherman Antitrust Act undeniably remains the
centerpiece of U.S. antitrust law.
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade.  It rests on the premise that the
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions.74
In order to effectuate its purposes and goals, the Sherman Act
affords causes of action to the government and to private persons
injured by unlawful restraints of trade and unfair business conduct.75
Moreover, the Act aims to eliminate anti-competitive conduct
occurring in interstate as well as international commerce.76  In theory,
when foreign corporations77 or U.S. subsidiaries located abroad
violate U.S. antitrust law, they should be treated no differently than
domestic corporations, who arguably are engaging in the same
activities.78
B. The Meaning and Background of Price-Fixing
“Perhaps the best-known antitrust violation is price-fixing, usually
attacked under section 1 of the [Sherman Act]. Courts broadly define
price-fixing [as] business or market combinations ‘formed for the

73. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 251
(1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994 & Supp. IV. 1998) (speaking to the reach of the
Sherman Act’s applicability); see also In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 932-34
(9th Cir. 1991) (noting that the Sherman Antitrust Act grants standing to all antitrust
violations that injure directly and indirectly), rev’g 723 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal. 1989),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764
(1993).
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (referring to the applicability of
the Sherman Act to conduct involving commerce with foreign nations); see also
Jeffrey L. Cotter, Comment, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Application of U.S. Antitrust
Laws to Acts Outside the United States—Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 113 S.
Ct. 2891 (1993), 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1109, 1115-16 (1994) (explaining that the
Sherman Act can be applied to business transactions conducted domestically and
those conducted abroad).
77. See Walker, supra note 70 (providing that for Sherman Act analysis, a
corporation is considered a “person”).
78. See also Renee Hardt, Kodak v. Fuji: A Test Case for the Extraterritorial Application
Sherman Act, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 309, 314 (1997) (indicating that the Sherman Act is
applied abroad).
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purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, . . . or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in . . . commerce’.”79  Historically,
courts have considered price-fixing activities under either the per se
illegal or the rule of reason approaches.80  The per se rule is used when
a court characterizes an activity as one “that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition. . . .”81  The courts adopted a per se
rule for price-fixing because the Supreme Court expressed in Northern
Pacific Railway, that the effects of price-fixing are so invariably
injurious that no inquiry into them is required.82  Merely engaging in
the proscribed conduct by agreeing to fix prices is a sufficient basis
for liability.83
The rule of reason approach, on the other hand, involves an
extensive analysis of the restraint of trade in place, which includes
balancing the anti-competitive effects of the restraint against any pro-
competitive effect of the restraint.84  If a court applies the rule of
reason, a great deal of judicial scrutiny is applied to the alleged price-
fixing practices.85  The two rules are mutually exclusive, yet once the
per se rule is invoked, the activity in question is “conclusively

79. Douglas R. Richmond, Private Colleges And Tuition Price-Fixing: An Antitrust
Primer, 17 J.C. & U.L. 271, 275 (1991) (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940)).
80. See id. at 281 (discussing the per se illegal and rule of reason doctrines and
their use in determining “whether challenged activities unreasonably restrain trade
in violation of the Sherman Act”).
81. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979).  See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 223 (finding that under the Sherman
Act a combination formed for the purpose of and with the effect of fixing prices is
illegal per se).
82. See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 223 (asserting that when a court finds a
practice to be per se illegal, it is conclusively presumed to be illegal without any
analysis of the underlying motivation behind such activity); see also Sitkin Smelting &
Refining Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 446 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that the per se
category of antitrust violations is made up of agreements or practices which because
of their pernicious effect on competition are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry into the precise harm
they have caused or business excuse for their use).
83. See N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5 (holding that there are certain agreements or
practices which because of their injurious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use); see also Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-51
(1977) (market restraints which affect price are illegal per se, and therefore no
elaborate inquiry need be made into the rationale behind the challenged conduct).
84. See Graphic Prod. Distributors v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1567-68 (11th Cir.
1983) (distinguishing when to utilize either the per se rule or the rule of reason); see
also LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 187 (1977) (asserting
that to apply the rule of reason “one must first identify specifically the practice
involved”).
85. See SULLIVAN, supra note 84, at 187 (positing that when an antitrust violation
is being handled judicially, analysis into the alleged misconduct is required to
determine whether a certain practice has an effect on competition).
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presumed illegal without further examination under the rule of
reason.”86
Price-fixing, such as the type OPEC engages in, is commonly
referred to as horizontal price-fixing.87  This practice refers to an
agreement between competitors who play the same market role, such
as manufacturers or wholesalers, to set, directly or indirectly, a price
for a specific commodity.88  A cartel89 arrangement, as with OPEC, is a
prime example of horizontal price-fixing.90
Historically, the judicial system’s original approach to horizontal
price-fixing was an attempt to completely eliminate cartels.91  A cartel
agreement, which can be effective only if the cartel members possess
market power, results in a transfer of wealth from consumers to
producers, and a loss of allocative efficiency by reason of increased
prices and consequently a lower volume of production.92  It is this
latter result—a decrease in the overall resource and financial wealth
of society vis-à-vis price fixing—that provides the primary rationale for
banning cartels.93
Arguably, the OPEC cartel, through its price-fixing activities,
commits a per se violation of section one of the Sherman Act.
However, given the jurisdictional impediments preventing a suit
against OPEC in U.S. courts, such activities cannot be monitored or
controlled by the United States.  Without antitrust sanctions,

86. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (inferring when
to advance the per se rule of price- fixing).
87. See generally MICHAEL J. COZZILLIO & MARK S. LEVINSTEIN, SPORTS LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 259 (1997) (describing the characteristics of a horizontal
agreement).
88. See Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Reasoning Per Se and Horizontal Price-Fixing: An
Emerging Trend in Antitrust Litigation?, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 39 n.2 (1986) (discussing
the per se rule as applied to horizontal price-fixing).
89. A cartel is defined as “[a] combination of producers or sellers that join
together to control a product’s production or price.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 206
(7th ed. 1999).
90. See infra Part IV.B (discussing why the collusive activities of OPEC and its
member countries, all of whose national oil companies operate at the same level of
the market, rise to the level of price-fixing).
91. See KRONSTEIN, supra note 39, at 357 (noting courts’ recognition of the
dangers that are inherent in cartels and the approaches taken to remedy these
dangers).
92. See id. at 340-41 (asserting that producers will possess market power if they
collectively face a downward-sloping demand curve, so that their joint output
decisions will determine what price they can charge).
93. See Thomas R. Webb, Note, Fixing the Price Fixing Confusion: A Rule of Reason
Approach, 92 YALE L.J. 706, 710-11 (1983) (stating that cartels should be proscribed
because they invariably lead to undesirable economic effects); see also United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323-24 (1897) (explaining that cartels
whose purposes are to control the production or manufacture of any particular
article in the market, and by such control dictate the price at which the article shall
be sold will have the effect of rendering the public subject to the decision of the
cartel).
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diplomacy cannot adequately deter cartel formation because it
cannot impose penalties on governments and cooperative private
companies that attempt to organize cartels, nor can they force
existing cartels to disgorge the profits reaped from their collusive
price-fixing activities.94
C. The Consistent Inconsistencies When Extraterritorially Applying
U.S. Antitrust Laws
Few aspects of the Sherman Act generate as much controversy as its
application to international trade or commerce.95  Neither the
Sherman Act itself nor its legislative history provides any clear indicia
of the scope of the extraterritorial96 jurisdiction conferred.97  For
nearly a century, courts attempted to define the metes and bounds of
the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws yet were
unsuccessful in its demarcation.98  A string of landmark cases strove to
define express limits, yet no bright line rule has emerged from these
opinions.99  However, in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,100 the
Supreme Court abandoned the approach used by most federal
courts101 in determining how to apply the Sherman Act
extraterritorially.102  Following the ruling in Hartford Fire, the United
States need not defer to the trade laws and policies of foreign

94. See International Uranium Cartel, 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 95th Cong. 2 (1977) (statement by Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.) (maintaining
that the availability of antitrust sanctions would further the anti-cartel objective).
95. Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Griffin, Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce
Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 199, 199 (1977)
(discussing the controversy surrounding the application of the Sherman Act to
foreign commerce).
96. “Extraterritoriality is essentially, and in common sense, a jurisdictional
concept concerning the authority of a nation to adjudicate the rights of particular
parties and to establish the norms of conduct applicable to events or persons outside
its borders.”  Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
97. See Kintner & Griffin, supra note 95, at 201-02 (providing commentary on the
congressional intent behind the enactment of the Sherman Act); see also Jo Rachel
Backer, Comment, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 1247, 1248-49 (1977) (noting the lack of clarity with respect to the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act).
98. See Cotter, supra note 76, at 1117 (citing precedent delineating the
uncertainty of the extraterritorial applicability of the Sherman Act).
99. See discussion infra Parts II.C.1, II.D (focusing on precedent dealing with the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws).
100. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
101. See generally discussion infra Parts II.C.1-2 (discussing the varying approaches
taken by federal courts in their application of the Sherman Act to acts abroad prior
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hartford Fire).
102. See Varun Gupta, Note, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J.
2287, 2287 (1996)(providing an overview of the history leading up to the Supreme
Court’s current approach to applying U.S. antitrust law extraterritorially).
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nations.103  The United States, in deciding whether or not to assert the
Sherman Act to the acts of foreign nations, may now solely evaluate
whether the foreign conduct intended substantial effect on the
American marketplace.104 The now defunct concept of heeding the
trade interests of a foreign nation with the expectation that that
foreign nation will reciprocate and likewise refrain from exercising
jurisdiction, is commonly known as international comity.105  Until the
decision in Hartford Fire, U.S. courts adhered to this concept when
deciding whether or not to subject foreign nations to antitrust
enforcement.106  Although comity may, and presumably would, still be
raised as a defense in an antitrust debate, its analysis is now moot
when determining whether to assert the Sherman Act abroad.
Meeting the requirement of the intended and substantial effects,
coupled with the minimum contact requirement of personal
jurisdiction,107 satisfies U.S. interests in international comity.108  Since
the United States is effectively willing to permit foreign nations to
subject American entities to similar antitrust enforcement, it is not
concerned with foreign nations’ potential negative reactions.109  Also,
as a practical procedural matter, “the traditional U.S. interest in
being fair to foreign [entities] is sufficiently protected by the
requirement that foreign businesses have ‘minmum contacts’ with
the United States to be brought into U.S. courts for violating U.S.

103. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993)
(advancing the rule that a U.S. court has jurisdiction over foreign conduct that
produces some substantial effect in the United States).
104. See id.
105. See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 281 n.1 (1982)
(defining comity as the voluntary “forbearance in the exercise of legitimate
jurisdiction when another sovereign also has legitimate jurisdiction under
international law”).  Maier notes that in the exercise of comity, one nation refrains
from enforcement of its interests ideally, while the sovereign with the greatest
interest will be permitted to pursue resolution.  Id. at 281.
106. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798 (noting that “Congress expressed no view on
the question whether a court with Sherman Act jurisdiction should ever decline to
exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international comity”).
107. In order to subject a defendant to suit in a specific forum, the defendant is
required to have certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).  When
determining whether such minimum contacts exist, courts must address the core
issue of whether a non-resident’s “conduct and connection with the forum State are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”  World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).  Due to the effects foreign
entities can have in the United States, the requisite minimum contacts of personal
jurisdiction will be assumed in all instances when discussing the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws for purposes of this Comment.
108. See Gupta, supra note 102, at 2317-18 (explaining the irrelevance of comity
analysis).
109. See id. at 2318.
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antitrust law.”110
1. The basis for extending the reach of the Sherman Act to acts performed
abroad:  the “effects” test
The legal significance of comity in antitrust cases diminished
substantially as new concerns regarding international antitrust cases
emerged.111  “Neither the United States government nor courts in
private antitrust litigation are required to engage in a comity interest
balancing analysis before proceeding in a foreign commerce case.”112
Accordingly, to explain why comity analysis is no longer necessary,
the following outlines the cases preceding Hartford Fire and explains
the abolition of the comity doctrine.113
The first Supreme Court foreign commerce case addressing the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act was American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co.,114 a private treble action case115 brought in 1909.
In American Banana, the Supreme Court determined antitrust laws do
not extend outside the borders of the United States because Congress
failed to express a clear intent to apply the Act extraterritorially.116
The Court added that the lawfulness of an activity is usually based

110. Id.
111. See supra Part II.C and infra Part II.D (discussing why comity analysis
essentially has been replaced by an inquiry into whether activities of foreign nations
have a substantial and intended effect on the U.S. market).
112. Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
563, 565 (2000).
113. See infra text accompanying notes 114-55 (discussing case law leading up to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hartford Fire to abandon comity analysis).
114. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).  In American Banana, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant monopolized the Central American banana trade by acquiring several
Costa Rican and Panamanian fruit distributors in violation of the Sherman Act.
American Banana, 213 U.S. at 355-57.
115. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  The statutory language defining a
treble damages action provides that any person “injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s
fee.” Id.  Section 7 of the Sherman Act, which first created the treble damages action
has since been replaced by § 4 of the Clayton Act.  The Clayton Act, however,
basically reenacted the damage provision of the Sherman Act and extended the
remedy to the new substantive violations the Clayton Act established.
116. See American Banana, 213 U.S. at 359 (“A conspiracy in this country to do acts
in another jurisdiction does not draw to itself those acts and make them unlawful, if
they are permitted by the local law.”); see also James S. McNeill, Comment,
Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction: Continuing the Confusion in Policy, Law, and
Jurisdiction, 28 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 425, 431 (1998) (commenting that the Supreme
Court dealt with the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act for the first time
in American Banana).  McNeill points out that when the Court applied the view that
the Sherman Act could not reach antitrust violations occurring outside the
jurisdiction of the United States, the first signs of judicial confusion about how to
analyze international antitrust disputes became apparent. Id.  The Court determined
that any action taken in the United States courts would interfere with the authority of
another sovereign’s freedom to regulate commerce as it saw fit.  Id. at 431-32.
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upon the laws of the country in which the activity took place.117
However, in 1945, the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America118 [hereinafter “Alcoa”]119 essentially overruled
the precedent set by American Banana.120 The Second Circuit was
acting in lieu of the Supreme Court due to lack of quorum among
the Justices.121 Alcoa became the first case to uphold the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law.122
In Alcoa, Aluminum Limited (“Limited”), a Canadian corporation,
colluded with German, French, Swiss, and British corporations to
form a foreign cartel under the guise of a Swiss corporation.123
Through self-imposed production quotas, the cartel attempted to
control aluminum production.124  While all of the defendant cartel
members were foreign, the quota severely restricted production of
aluminum imported into the United States.125  The central question
in this case was whether the Sherman Act could be applied to

117. See American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356 (indicating that to subject an actor of
another jurisdiction to the laws of the jurisdiction in which his acts effects were felt,
would not only be unjust, but would interfere with the authority of another sovereign
and would be contrary to international notions of comity); see infra notes 134-38 and
accompanying text (defining the concept of comity and its international
implications).
118. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
119. Alcoa was a Pennsylvania corporation organized in 1888 and it continued to
monopolize the ingot aluminum industry, as it was the industry’s sole manufacturer,
for thirty years in the United States. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 422.
120. See id. at 443-44 (finding that, in certain circumstances, the Sherman Act may
extend beyond the borders of the United States).
121. The appeal went to the Second Circuit because the Supreme Court was
unable to achieve a quorum of six justices.  See 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(stipulating that the Supreme Court has the discretion to “remand [a] case to the
court of appeals which shall then have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same
as if the appeal . . . had been docketed in the court of appeals in the first instance
[given that the action is brought under the Sherman Act]”).
122. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 443-44 (holding that the Sherman Act is
applicable to acts outside the United States having consequences inside the United
States); see also Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: A
Postscript on Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 213, 214
(1993) (asserting that Alcoa began the trend of asserting “jurisdiction over foreign
defendants whose anti-competitive activities have the intended effect of causing a
substantially adverse impact in U.S. commerce”) (emphasis added).
123. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 442 (describing the character of the
agreement, which triggered Sherman Act application).
124. See id. at 442 (“The . . . ‘cartel[]’ provided for the formation of a
corporation . . . [which] was from time to time  to fix a quota of production . . . .”).
See generally James M. Grippando, Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial Antitrust
Jurisdiction on Grounds of International Comity: An Illegitimate Extension of the Judicial
Abstention Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 395, 403 (1983) (recounting the history leading
up to the formulation of the “effects” test promulgated in Alcoa).
125. In Alcoa, the U.S. government sought to break up Alcoa’s domestic aluminum
monopoly, and also challenged activities of Alcoa’s independent Canadian
subsidiary, Aluminum Limited.  See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 421-22; see also
Grippando, supra note 124, at 403 (discussing the power possessed by the cartel
members in Alcoa as well as the far- reaching effects of their concerted actions).
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invalidate a foreign cartel when its only connection to the United
States was the importation of aluminum ingot to the U.S. market.126
The Second Circuit, acting in lieu of the Supreme Court,127
articulated in Alcoa a two-pronged “effects” test for determining
federal jurisdiction over foreign companies.128  Under the “effects”
test, the conduct first must have a substantial and intended negative
effect on U.S. commerce.129  Second, the conduct actually has to have
such a negative effect.130  Accordingly, the court in Alcoa found
antitrust violations and applied the Sherman Act extraterritorially as
the foreign conduct indeed manifested negative effects in the United
States, and such effects were intended.131
Following Alcoa, the “effects” test gained wide acceptance in the
United States,132 yet received criticism abroad.133  Much of the

126. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 443 (discussing application of the
Sherman Act to foreign corporations for conduct outside the United States).
127. See supra note 121 (explaining why the Second Circuit in this instance heard
the case).
128. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 443 (asserting that where both
conditions of “intent” and “effect” are satisfied, the exercise of jurisdiction is
proper).
129. See id. (finding that the requisite intent of the international cartel members
in their agreement was expressly made when they sought to achieve an effect upon
imports into the United States).
130. See id. (ruling that the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially only if both
intent and effect are present); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 415 reporters note 3 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)] (maintaining that Alcoa established a two-part test requiring intent and
effect).
131. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 443 (finding that the Canadian
corporation’s actions violated the Sherman Act).  The Second Circuit held that the
cartel’s agreement to maintain quotas on aluminum exported to the United States
satisfied the intent requirement of the effects test.  Id.  With respect to the actual
negative effect felt in the United States, the court held that “after the intent to affect
imports was proved, the burden of proof shifted to ‘Limited’ [the Canadian
corporation].” Id.  As the court found that the government had not met its burden
by showing an effect on imports, not that the Canadian corporation had proven the
absence of an effect, this burden shift was decisive.  Id.  See also Gabriela Burghelea,
Note, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law And the National Environmental
Policy Act: A Comparative Study, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 357-58 (1996)
(discussing extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in Alcoa).
132. See Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704
(1962) (concluding that “[a] conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or
foreign commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act
just because part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries,” and
therefore is not unacceptable).  The Supreme Court in Continental Ore found that the
defendants’ deliberate monopolistic control of the vanadium ore industry caused
forbidden results within the United States and hence was within the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts; therefore, the defendants could be punished for violations of U.S. laws.
See id. at 705 (finding Alcoa applicable since the defendants’ activities had a negative
effect within the United States); see also id. (finding “[a] combination entered into
with the United States to monopolize an article of commerce produced abroad was
held to violate the Sherman Act although discriminatory legislation of the foreign
country aided the defendants’ control of that production”).
The Court found that since the acts of the defendants had an adverse effect within
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criticism charged that the test neglected to give deference to notions
of international comity.134  Generally, international comity is a fairness
doctrine by which the United States decides not to apply U.S. laws to
other nations.135  The hope and expectation is that these other
nations will reciprocate and not apply their laws “unreasonably” to
the United States.136  Many foreign governments alleged the
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws violated public
international law, and therefore, opposed U.S. jurisdictional
assertions.137  As it became increasingly apparent that the “effects” test
failed to consider problems of international comity, there was the
need for a more responsive standard.138

the United States and upon its foreign trade, the Alcoa “effects” test was held
controlling. Id. See also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co. Ltd., 395 F.
Supp. 221, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (further modifying the extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act by finding that “[t]he intent requirement, [part of Alcoa’s ‘effects’
test,] is a general intent to affect commerce, ‘and may be satisfied by the rule that a
person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his actions’”) (citations
omitted).  Fleischmann involved a suit by two domestic companies against three
foreign companies.  Id.  The domestic companies, pursuant to the terms of a
distributorship agreement, were the exclusive American distributors of scotch
whiskey manufactured by the defendants. Id. at 233.  Upon termination of the
distributorship, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that the defendants conspired to
impose unreasonably short terms for distributorship and notices of termination
provisions in violation of the Sherman Act.  Id. at 226.
133. See JAMES R. ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD § 6.09 (1981) (noting that a “weakness of the Alcoa analysis was its
perceived failure to take into account the possible legitimate interests of other
nations affected by an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction”); see also Michael F.
Kelley, The Prescriptive Jurisdictional Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law: Judge Learned Hand’s
Requirement of a “Substantive Anticompetitive Effect”, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 195,
236 (1991) (“Many foreign governments and commentators have severely criticized
the Alcoa decision as being in violation of international law, in large part, due to an
improper reading of a mechanical effects test into the decision.”).
134. See supra note 105 (defining the concept of international comity).
135. See Peter Durack, Australia: Conflicts and Comity, in ACT OF STATE AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 43 (John R. Lacey ed., 1983)
(“[International c]omity is a way of saying fair play—that each of two parties will yield
to the one that has interests that are clearly paramount.  It is a word signifying a
concern for common decency in conduct towards others.”).
136. See generally id. (stating that in deferring to the concept of comity, a nation
should “give good faith consideration” to other nations).
137. See Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 32 (1992) (indicating that the broad extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust laws to conduct occurring abroad did not win international
acceptance).  A number of the United States’ major trading partners, most notably
those in Europe dealing in shipping, watch making, synthetic fibers, petroleum, hard
metals and newsprint, enacted blocking statutes and other laws designed to prevent
the extraterritorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws.  Id. at 33.
138. See, e.g., Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296 (3d
Cir. 1979) (“When foreign nations are involved . . . it is unwise to ignore the fact that
foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and limitations of judicial power are
considerations that should have a bearing on the decision to exercise or decline
jurisdiction.”).
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2. Limitations of the “effects” test and foreign response to the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws
In response to the foreign resentment caused by the “effects” test
set forth in Alcoa, U.S. courts began to advance jurisdictional tests139
that incorporated the principle of international comity.140  These tests
balanced the interests of the United States in regulating anti-
competitive activity against the legitimate sovereignty interest of other
nations.141  For example, in 1976, the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,142 explicitly recognized United States
interests in international comity.143  The court held the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction should always be reasonable in addition to
finding an intended and actual effect on U.S. commerce.144
The Ninth Circuit in Timberlane, analyzed the Sherman Act’s
extraterritorial jurisdictional jurisprudence and in turn expanded the
“effects” test pronounced in Alcoa to include the requirement that
courts consider the concept of international comity before exercising

139. For example, two Supreme Court decisions have found that U.S. jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act can be asserted on foreign corporations engaging in anti-
competitive behavior that takes a direct toll on the United States.  In Continental Ore,
the Court held that corporations charged with conspiracy to restrain trade “are not
insulated [from U.S. antitrust laws] by the fact that their conspiracy involved some
acts by the agent of a foreign government.” Id. 370 U.S. at 706.  The Continental Ore
Court upheld jurisdiction over a U.S. company’s Canadian subsidiary that had
restrained the export sales of another U.S. company. Id. at 710.  In Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), the Court found that foreign
and U.S. corporations engaged in anti-competitive behavior occurring partly within
and partly outside the United States are subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act if the challenged behavior has an anti-competitive effect in the United
States.  Id. at 118-19.
140. Compare Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (defining comity as “the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.”), with Maier, supra note 105 and accompanying text
(describing comity as abstention from suit against another nation when both nations
have legitimate jurisdiction).
141. See Alford, supra note 122, at 215 (noting courts’ efforts taken in response to
the hostility the “effects” test provoked abroad); see also Edward L. Rholl, Comment,
Inconsistent Application of The Extraterritorial Provisions of the Sherman Act: A Judicial
Response Based Upon the Much Maligned “Effects” Test, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 435, 442-43
(1990) (arguing that “once the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act was
established in Alcoa, courts felt compelled to refine the broad test outlined by Judge
Hand to gauge the extent of the effects and the nature of intent necessary to invoke
subject matter jurisdiction”).
142. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
143. See id. at 613-15 (noting that when a case presents a conflict of international
laws, comity interests should be evaluated).
144. See id. at 613 (finding that “there is the additional question [of
reasonableness] which is unique to the international setting of whether the interests
of, and links to, the United States—including the magnitude of the effect on
American foreign commerce—are sufficiently strong, vis-à-vis those of other nations,
to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.”).
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jurisdiction.145  The Timberlane court determined that a tripartite
analysis was the appropriate means of determining whether U.S.
antitrust laws should apply in that case.146  Parts one and two were
taken directly from the Alcoa’s “effects” test.147  Part one of the
Timberlane test acknowledges antitrust laws require, in the first
instance, there be some actual or intended effect on American
commerce before federal courts justifiably may grant subject matter
jurisdiction.148  Part two requires a demonstration of evidence of the
type and magnitude of the offense that is sufficiently large to
represent a cognizable injury.149  Under the third part of the
Timberlane test, the court comprised a list of seven factors known as
the “jurisdictional rule of reason,”150 as an interest-balancing test
designed to determine whether comity should deter the exercise of
jurisdiction.151

145. See id. at 609 (“Extraterritorial application is understandably a matter of
concern for the other countries involved.”); see also Mark L. Seiden, Comment,
Antitrust Law—Extraterritorial Jurisdiction—Foreign Law Permitting Conspiracy to Restrain
Trade Does Not Prevent Sherman Act’s Extraterritorial Application, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993), 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 307, 311 (1995)
(discussing the Timberlane court’s balancing requirement for extraterritorial antitrust
jurisdiction).
146. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613 (articulating the requisites to asserting the
Sherman Act extraterritorially); see also Margaret Holthusen, U.S. Courts: Walking the
Tightrope Between American Trade Interests and International Comity—Do The Factors
Presented in Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of The United
States Facilitate the Determination of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of United States Antitrust
Law?, 4 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 60, 62 (1991) (analyzing how the Timberlane court
expanded the “effects” test to include the need for more comprehensive and precise
principles of jurisdictional restraint); ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 133, § 6.05
(discussing the Timberlane court’s balancing requirement for extraterritorial
jurisdiction).
147. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir.
1945); see also ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 133 (describing the Timberlane court’s
employment of Alcoa’s “effects” test).
148. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613 (restating part one of the Alcoa court’s “effects”
test).
149. See id. (restating part two of the Alcoa court’s “effects” test).
150. See id.  The court proposed the following comity factors to determine if
foreign interests outweigh United States’ interests:
(1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; (2) the nationality or
allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of
corporations; (3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can be
expected to achieve compliance; (4) the relative significance of effects on
the United States as compared with those elsewhere; (5) the extent to which
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce; (6) the
forseeability of such effect; and (7) the relative importance to the violations
charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad.
549 F.2d at 614.
151. See id. at 613-14 (presenting factors to be considered in jurisdictional
analysis); see also William N. Friedler, Comment, Antitrust Law—Court Must Consider
International Comity in Exercising Jurisdiction Under Sherman Act; Mannington Mills, Inc.
v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979), 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 185,
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Timberlane was the first meaningful endeavor to create a rule of
U.S. antitrust jurisdiction that took international concerns fully into
account.152  Several circuit courts have recognized the Timberlane
interest balancing test and varieties thereof as an appropriate
mechanism both to consider international comity and to decide
whether to assert extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction.153  While the
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the appropriateness of this
balancing test,154 the Court has considered foreign laws’ impact on

189 (1980) (discussing the Timberlane court’s recognition of international comity in
evaluating whether to assert jurisdiction based on an extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act, and the seven factor analysis that emanated from that decision).
152. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613 (noting that international comity and fairness,
in addition to an effect on U.S. commerce, are necessary factors in determining
whether to assert the Sherman act extraterritorially); see also John H. Chung,
Comment, The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 and the
Maelstrom Surrounding the Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act, 69 TEMP. L. REV.
371, 394 (1996) (explaining the Timberlane court’s sentiments of necessity of
evaluating foreign interests).
153. See Joseph P. Griffin, Justices Finally Tackle “Foreign Conduct”, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 9,
1993, at 29 (listing circuits that adhere to the Timberlane analysis); Grippando, supra
note 124, at 409 (noting that subsequent courts adopted the test set forth in
Timberlane in several forms); see, e.g., Indust. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d
876, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying the interest balancing test to hold that antitrust
laws should not be applied in violation of international comity); Montreal Trading
Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1981) (adopting and adhering to
the Timberlane test); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297
(3d Cir. 1979) (finding that comity concerns should be part of jurisdictional
determination); Daishowa Int’l v. N. Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P
64,774, at 71,789 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (finding that comity analysis is an important part
of jurisdictional determination).  But see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting the balancing approach
and concluding that a judicial balancing of competing foreign and domestic interests
would be improper).
In Mitsui, the court viewed the balancing test as an abstention doctrine rather than
a jurisdictional test.  See Mitsui, 671 F.2d at 884-85.  In Montreal Trading, the Tenth
Circuit found no set of factors exclusive in deciding whether to dismiss an
extraterritorial antitrust action.  See Montreal Trading, 661 F.2d at 869-70.  In
Mannington Mills, the Third Circuit expanded the seven-factor list, and stated ten
factors to be analyzed to determine if extraterritorial jurisdiction should be asserted.
See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98.  The three additional extraterritorial
jurisdiction criteria catalogued by the Mannington Mills court included “[w]hether
the court can make its order effective; [w]hether an order for relief would be
accepted in this country if made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances;
[and] [w]hether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.” Id.  The
court altered the analysis by separating the questions of jurisdiction and comity, as it
considered comity an abstention doctrine used to determine whether jurisdiction
should be exercised.  Id. at 1294.
154. See Deanna Conn, Note, Assessing the Impact of Preferential Trade Agreements and
New Rules of Origin on the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law to International
Mergers, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 146 (1993) (discussing the split in circuits, which the
Supreme Court has yet to resolve, over the Timberlane court’s balancing approach);
Holthusen, supra note 146, at 63 (stating that the Supreme Court has not yet ruled
on interest balancing in an antitrust context); ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 133,
§ 6.11 (asserting that the Timberlane court’s analysis lacks Supreme Court approval).
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the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act.155
D.  Hartford Fire and the Death of Comity
The Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Hartford Fire was a profound
departure from the trend established by the Ninth Circuit in
Timberlane.156  In Hartford Fire, the Court did not expressly rule on the
availability of comity to dismiss a claim brought under the
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act;157  but the Court did erect a
formidable barrier to the use of a comity analysis.158  Accordingly,
rather than employing the Timberlane comity analysis, the Supreme
Court held that the pertinent question to ask was, “whether there is
in fact a ‘true conflict’ between domestic and foreign law.”159  No true
conflict exists “where a person subject to regulation by two states can
comply with the laws of both.”160  Consequently, in holding that

155. See Cont’l Ore. Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705-07
(1962) (considering the impact of foreign laws on the extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust laws); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276
(1927) (assessing the effect of foreign legislation upon United States antitrust
jurisdiction).
156. See Scott A. Burr, The Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to Foreign Conduct: Has
Hartford Fire Extinguished Considerations of Comity?, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 221, 223
(1994) (noting that the long adhered to theories of domestic conflict of laws in
determining whether to apply U.S. antitrust law extraterritorially have been thwarted
by the ruling in Hartford Fire).
157. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797 (1993) (discussing
how the Court declined to rule on the issue of comity).  In Hartford Fire, nineteen
states and various private parties filed suit against several domestic insurers, as well as
a conglomerate of London reinsurers, alleging an international conspiracy to restrict
the commercial insurance market. Id. at 774-76.  The Court found that the only
substantive issue was whether the disparity between British law and United States law
supported dismissal.  Id. at 798.  Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice Rhenquist,
and Justices, White, Blackmun and Stevens, held that since the alleged foreign
conduct at issue was, “meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial
effect in the United States,” the Sherman Act applied to that foreign conduct. Id. at
796.  See also United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 273-75 (1927) (finding
that a conspiracy under foreign law, without more, is insufficient to bar the
application of United States antitrust law to acts performed abroad).  This is a well-
reasoned analysis since a foreign nation’s law should not be a concern where there
are no substantive foreign interests to support dismissal of the action.  See In re Ins.
Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 932-34 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).  The Ninth Circuit found
that to dismiss the action against the London reinsurers solely on the grounds that
British law allowed anti-competitive conduct would be to grant the British insurance
industry a special immunity from U.S. antitrust laws, and comity does not require
such a grant of immunity.  Id. at 934.
158. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813-15; see also Robert C. Reuland, Hartford Fire
Insurance Co., Comity, and the Extraterritorial Reach of United States Antitrust Laws, 29
TEX. INT’L L.J. 159, 161 (1994) (noting that the Hartford Fire decision will result in
foreign concerns not being given “proper account” in U.S. courts).
159. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798 (quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (internal
quotations added)).
160. Id. at 799 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 130, § 403, cmt. e).
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Hartford Fire presented no “true conflict,” the Supreme Court  ruled
that a U.S. court should not consider the interests of a foreign
sovereign unless a “true conflict” exists between U.S. law and the law
of the foreign state.161  Accordingly, Hartford Fire demonstrates that no
jurisprudential obstruction precludes the application of U.S. antitrust
law abroad.162
The Court in Hartford Fire discarded Timberlane’s “jurisdictional rule
of reason,” requiring satisfaction of the “true conflict” test before
importing Timberlane’s comity analysis.163  This significantly limited
Timberlane’s applicability to future cases.164  Indeed, the Hartford Fire
restriction leaves only the “effects” test as a barrier to the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction.165

161. See id. at 815 (finding that a “true conflict” exists only when foreign law
requires a defendant to violate U.S. law or when compliance with both the law of the
United States and that of the defendant’s nation is impossible).  The Court also
found that there existed no “true conflict” because foreign law did not require the
defendants to act in some fashion prohibited by U.S. law and because compliance
with both U.S. and foreign law was not impossible.  See id.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Thomas,
voiced sharp disagreement with the Court’s “conclu[sion] that no ‘true conflict’
counseling nonapplication of United States law . . . exists unless compliance with
United States law would constitute a violation of another country’s law.” Id. at 820.
Justice Scalia referenced several circuit court cases, including Timberlane and
Mannington Mills, in support of his assertion that international comity concerns were
proper when attempting to extend enforcement of the Sherman Act
extraterritorially. Id. at 817.  The dissent further argued that under the factors set
forth in Section 403 of the Restatement (Third), any “nation having a basis for
jurisdiction to prescribe a law must refrain from exercising that jurisdiction” if such
an exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.  Id. at 818.  In Justice Scalia’s view,
comity is not a doctrine of judicial abstention, which allows a court discretion to
determine whether it should exercise or decline jurisdiction in light of competing
international concerns. See id. at 818 n.9.
162. See id. at 798-99 (discussing the means by which the United States can
exercise the Sherman Act extraterritorially).
163. See id. at 818-20 (determining that where there is no conflict between the laws
of the United States and the nation against which the United States seeks to file suit,
there is no need to weigh factors of comity).
164. See generally id. at 797-99 (addressing the mootness of comity analysis as
promulgated in Timberlane).
165. The Court in Hartford Fire adopted the “effects” jurisdictional standard as
promulgated by Congress in Title IV of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982,
entitled the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1984 (“FTAIA”). See 15
U.S.C. § 6a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). FTAIA gives federal courts subject matter
jurisdiction over conduct having a “direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effect” upon U.S. commerce.  Id.  While the language of the FTAIA stipulates that it
is applicable solely to non-import trade or commerce with foreign nations, “the Act’
jurisdictional standard is viewed as generally declaratory of the existing state of the
law and may be seen, therefore, as congressional acknowledgment of effects
jurisdiction.”  Reuland, supra note 158, at 187 n.224 (referencing the “FTAIA in
support of the general proposition that jurisdiction may be based on effects upon
‘U.S. interstate commerce, on import trade and commerce, or on the export trade or
commerce of a person engaged in trade or commerce in the United States’”).  The
language of the FTAIA is codified as section 6a of the Sherman Act.  See generally
supra note 70 (providing that the Sherman Act applies when conduct involving trade
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III. PLACING RESTRICTIONS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST
JURISDICTION BASED ON SOVEREIGN INTERESTS
Despite the sufficiency of the Alcoa “effects” test, as well as the
elimination of an explicit analysis of international comity as
delineated in Hartford Fire, various restraints still exist on the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws.166  For example, U.S.
courts traditionally have honored a sovereign nation’s authority to
engage in its own economic initiatives.167  The Alcoa court held acts
committed overseas by foreign parties are subject to antitrust
jurisdiction if those actions had a substantial and intended negative
effect on U.S. commerce and were illegal under domestic antitrust
laws.168  Broadly speaking, Alcoa held that the Sherman Act applies to
foreign activity if the elements of the “effects” test are met.169  An
attempt by a U.S. court to assert extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction
over a foreign nation, however, even after the court has
acknowledged subject matter jurisdiction based on this test, may be
restricted by the sovereign immunity170 and act of state doctrines.171
Despite the existence of such doctrines, however, they have not
substantially reduced the extent to which U.S. courts have asserted
extraterritorial jurisdiction, notwithstanding international protest.172

or commerce with foreign nations has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect” on the United States).
166. See Gupta, supra note 102, at 2288 (asserting that a forbearance of comity
analysis still may not be sufficient to assert the Sherman Act extraterritorially).
167. See Sandra C. Hymowitz, Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act to
Foreign Corporations, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513, 525 (1986) (stating that a court does not
have to exercise jurisdiction even where there was extraterritorial conduct and the
court is not prevented from hearing the case on comity principles).
168. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)
(“[A]ny state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders that has [negative] consequences within its borders
which the state reprehends . . . .”).
169. See id. at 444 (suggesting that the Sherman Act extends to cover acts abroad if
the acts have an effect in the United States, and the effect was intended).
170. See generally Comment, Sovereign Immunity of States Engaged in Commercial
Activities, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1086, 1087 (1965) (discussing the historical approach to
asserting jurisdiction over a sovereign nation).  The concept of sovereign immunity
was designed to insulate foreign states from private suits and has been justified on
the ground that it avoids “international friction.” See id. (quoting Hersch
Lauterpacht, The Problems of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 220, 240 (1951)).
171. See infra Part III.B (detailing the act of state doctrine’s limitation on
jurisdictional immunity).
172. See Chung, supra note 152, at 383-84 (discussing the defenses a defendant in
an antitrust action may assert in order to preclude jurisdiction).
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A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The doctrine of sovereign immunity controls the susceptibility of
foreign states173 to suit in U.S. courts.174  It is a limitation on in
personam or in rem jurisdiction rather than a substantive defense to
antitrust suits.175  The Supreme Court formulated the doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,176
basing its decision on the “perfect equality and absolute
independence of sovereigns” and the “common interest impelling
them to mutual intercourse.”177
This “absolute theory” of sovereign immunity began to attract
criticism when it became apparent that nations were engaging in
what were historically considered commercial activities,178 and
consequently could not be sanctioned in court.179  In fact, under this
“absolute theory” of sovereign immunity,180 a foreign state is not
amenable to any lawsuit in the courts of another foreign state without
its consent.181  Consequently, as private commercial enterprises found

173. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (“A ‘foreign state,’ . . .
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state as defined in subsection (b).”); see also supra note 37 and accompanying
text (describing the characteristics of an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign
state).
174. See generally Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (deciding
whether actions taken by the Republic of Arg. warrant stripping that nation of its
sovereign status); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428
(1989) (announcing that a foreign nation is immune from suit in the United States
and, aside from certain exceptions, jurisdiction shall not be asserted over a foreign
nation in a U.S. court).
175. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (finding that where a defendant’s
status as a foreign sovereign provides grounds for dismissal, a plaintiff may have no
other forum in which to bring his action).
176. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
177. Id. at 137. The Chief Justice held that, although a nation necessarily
possessed exclusive and absolute jurisdiction within its own territorial boundaries, it
implicitly waives jurisdiction over a foreign state’s agent or property in the absence of
prior notice.  See id. at 139.
178. See discussion infra Part III.A.1 (defining and exemplifying commercial
activities).
179. See Backer, supra note 97, at 1251-52 (discussing the problems with the
absolute theory of immunity); see, e.g., The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y.
1921), vacated and dismissed for lack of juris., 13 F.2d 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1926), aff’d sub nom.
Berrizi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (finding immunity of a
foreign state entity, without distinguishing between its commercial and governmental
acts).
180. The “absolute theory” of sovereign immunity makes no distinction between a
state’s “governmental” acts and “private” acts.  See Lauterpacht, supra note 170, at
221-29 (asserting that absolute immunity, the purpose of which was to avoid
‘international friction,’ began to stir up criticism given its far-reaching power).
181. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T ST.
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that they were unable to resort to the judicial process for the
resolution of ordinary disputes arising out of business dealings, they
saw themselves at a distinct competitive disadvantage to state-owned
commercial entities.182  In response to this problem, the State
Department officially adopted the “restrictive theory” of sovereign
immunity in 1952, which denied immunity to sovereign nations in
cases arising out of commercial activity.183  As suits involving the
commercial activities of foreign nations became more prevalent, U.S.
courts began to follow this theory and to apply this new approach.184
In 1976, Congress broke new ground by officially codifying the
“restrictive theory” of sovereign immunity when it passed the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”).185  The FSIA stated that sovereign
immunity extends only to claims arising out of activities that may be
characterized as purely governmental as opposed to commercial.186
The Act sets forth the exclusive standards used to decide all sovereign
immunity issues raised in U.S. courts.187  One innovation included in

BULL. 984-85 (1952), and Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711
(1976) (app. 2 to opinion of White, J.) [hereinafter The Tate Letter] (announcing a
need for a change in U.S. policy regarding sovereign immunity given the
unworkability of the absolute theory).
182. See generally Danny Abir, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The Right to a Jury
Trial in Suits Against Foreign Government-Owned Corporations, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 159,
162-63 (1996) (explaining the development and abandonment of the absolute
theory of sovereign immunity).
183. See The Tate Letter, supra note 181.  The State Department gave three reasons
for this change in policy:
(1) the increased international acceptance of the “restrictive theory,” and
the consequent sentiment that if the United States was allowing itself to be
sued in other countries on that theory, its courts should have the same
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns; (2) the fact that communist countries
benefited from the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, which afforded
immunity to state trading companies but not to private companies of
capitalist countries; and (3) the fact that the growth of governmental
involvement in commercial activities necessitated a practice that will enable
parties doing business with them to have their rights determined by the
courts.
Id.
184. See id. (recognizing that the courts were likely to follow the lead of the State
Department, while not legally bound to do so).
185. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2892 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
186. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (stating the general purpose of
the FSIA).
187. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-07 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing the
standards for immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction and the exceptions to
these standards); see also Arg. Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428,
443 (1989) (stating that the FSIA governs the issue of whether foreign states are
immune in foreign courts); Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Immunity of
Foreign Sovereign from Suit in Federal or State Courts, 25 A.L.R.3d 322, 366 (1980)
(considering the modern status of the rules dealing with the doctrine of immunity of
a foreign sovereign in American courts).
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the FSIA was the direct connection between the issue of immunity
and the contacts that link the dispute with the United States.188  The
contacts with the foreign jurisdiction are of the utmost importance
when deciding whether a U.S. court should exercise jurisdiction over
an action brought against a foreign sovereign.189  In principle, a
government should be accountable in its country’s courts for its
actions.190  It does not follow, however, that a government should be
held accountable in a foreign court for a particular action.191  That
determination depends upon balancing the interests of the forum
state in the particular transaction and considerations of comity that
might make it inappropriate for a foreign court to review the acts of a
coequal sovereign.192
1. The commercial activity exception to sovereign immunity
The draftsmen of the FSIA purported to have U.S. courts decide
whether a foreign sovereign could be sued.193  The general rule under
the FSIA is that foreign states—including their agents and
instrumentalities—are immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts if
they engage in activities that are purely governmental.194  Section
1604 of the FSIA presents this general rule, and provides that, subject

188. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing that in certain
circumstances a sovereign may lose its immunity if certain types of contacts with or
acts having an effect within the United States exist).
189. See S. Jason Balesta, Comment, The Cost Of Closure: A Reexamination Of The
Theory And Practice Of The 1996 Amendments To The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1266 (2000) (noting that to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
state, it is necessary to have a solid extraterritorial jurisdiction basis).
190. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1602-07 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (implying that
foreign nations and their governments are typically immune from suit in the United
States and, therefore, should be held accountable only for their actions in the courts
of their country).
191. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (determining that claims against
foreign nations shall not be adjudicated in the United States, subject to certain
exceptions provided in the statute).
192. See generally Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (finding that
considerations of comity underlay the concept of sovereign immunity).
193. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-07 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (creating a
presumption of immunity, yet subject to certain exception, foreign nations are held
accountable for their actions that have an effect in the U.S. and consequently lose
their immune status).
194. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (declaring a foreign state shall
be immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts if not subject to an exception to
jurisdictional immunity); see also Forsythe v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 885 F.2d
285, 288 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that the FSIA is the exclusive means by which a
foreign state may be sued in the United States); Coleman v. Alcolac, Inc., 888 F.
Supp. 1388, 1400 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (discussing the general rule of FSIA); Ebrahim v.
Shell Oil Co., 847 F. Supp. 65, 67 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that an entity is immune
from suit under the FSIA if it is an instrumentality of a foreign state); Gibbons v.
Republic of Ireland, 532 F. Supp. 668, 671 (D.D.C. 1982) (stating that immunity of
foreign states remains the rule rather than the exception and must be respected by
the courts of the United States).
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to existing international agreements between the foreign state and
the United States at the time of enactment, a foreign state shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts,195 except as provided by
sections 1605196 and 1607.197  By enacting these exceptions, Congress

195. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (stating that exceptions to this
section are contained in sections 1605 and 1607).
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Section 1605 enumerates the
general exceptions to section 1604:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case—
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by
implication. . . ;
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that
act causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law . . . ;
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succession or
gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in
issue;
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by
the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or
employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment. . . ;
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by
the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to
arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise
between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award made
pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate . . . ; or
(7) not otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which money damages are
sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by
an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or
the provision of material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A
of title 18) for such an act if such act or provision of material support is
engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while
acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1605.
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  Section 1607(a) provides in
part:
In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign state
intervenes, in a court of the United States or of a State, the foreign state shall
not be accorded immunity with respect to any counterclaim, (a) for which a
foreign state would not be entitled to immunity under section 1605 . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1607(a).  See also Exp. Group v. Reef Indus., 54 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that the FSIA creates the statutory presumption that foreign states
and its agents and instrumentalities are immune from suit unless one of the specific
exceptions enumerated in the Act applies); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that foreign states, as a general
rule, are immune to suit in the United States, subject to certain exceptions);
Bahsoon v. Pezetel, Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 507, 510 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (finding that under
the FSIA immunity is the general rule and must be adhered to unless it is clearly
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codified the “restrictive view” of sovereign immunity, thereby denying
immunity in certain instances.198
The commercial activity199 exception, enumerated as one of the
general exceptions under section 1605, remains the most ambiguous
exception to sovereign immunity.200  The first sentence of the
definition of commercial activity, found in section 1603, simply
establishes that the commercial nature of an activity does not depend
upon whether it is a single act or a regular course of conduct.201  The
second sentence specifies what element of the conduct determines
commerciality, but still fails to define “commercial.”202  Unfortunately,
the FSIA has provided a rather tautological definition of commercial
activity, offering no clear-cut distinction as to what separates a
commercial activity from a governmental activity.203  There have,
however, been a multitude of attempts and tests set forth by federal
courts designed to clarify this uncertainty.204  The courts have been

shown that an exception applies).
198. “Certain instances” refers to the exception to jurisdictional immunity of a
foreign state.  See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-07 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 610-11 (1992) (finding that foreign
sovereigns are immune from U.S. jurisdiction “unless one of several statutorily
defined exceptions applies”).  When a foreign state engages in commercial activity it
loses its immunity under the FSIA and becomes amenable to suit in the United
States.  See id.
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
A “commercial activity” means either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.  The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by the reference to the nature of
the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by
reference to its purpose.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)
200. See generally Todd Connors, Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Using
Separation of Powers Analysis to Guide Judicial Decision-Making, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L
BUS. 203, 213-19 (1994) (discussing the lack of guidance provided as to what exactly
is encompassed within a commercial activity); see also Jack Garvey, Judicial Foreign
Policy Making in International Civil Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers,
24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 461, 463-68 (1993) (furthering the assertion that the text
of the commercial activity exception is ambiguous and provides no clear cut standard
by which to distinguish commercial activities from governmental activities).
201. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (distinguishing between the
nature and purpose of a commercial activity).
202. Id.  See also Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614 (pointing out the ambiguity of the
commercial activities exception); cf. McDermott Int’l v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342
(1990) (stating that “when a statute uses [a term of art], Congress intended it to have
its established meaning”).
203. See Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the “Sovereign” Out of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 YALE J.
INT’L L. 489, 499 (1992) (stating that the FSIA definition of commercial activity,
under which either a regular course of conduct or a particular transaction may be
considered commercial by reference to the nature of the activity, not its purpose, is
tautological).
204. See, e.g., Weltover, 504 U.S. at 611 (using a three-step analysis based on the
third commercial activity exception).  First, the court decides whether the activity is
commercial or sovereign in nature. Id.  Second, if the court finds the activity to be
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given enormous latitude to make this distinction, despite the
guidelines set out in the legislative history of the FSIA.205  Ultimately,
the courts will play the role traditionally played by the State
Department in granting immunity.206
2. Distinguishing between governmental and commercial activities:  the
nature v. purpose test
To distinguish between a foreign state’s governmental and
commercial activities for purposes of determining sovereign
immunity, a high standard of analysis must be in place.207  To facilitate
this distinction, the United States, through the FSIA, developed the
“nature versus purpose test.”208  This test asserts that the commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or of the particular transaction or
act, rather than referencing that activity’s purpose.209  Under the

commercial, it determines whether the claim is based upon the commercial activity.
Id.  Third, the court decides whether the commercial activity has a sufficient
connection or nexus with the United States.  Id.  The Court in Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, also applied the three-step commercial activity exception analysis, but noted,
that while it used the three-step commercial activity analysis to make its
determination, the FSIA is still too nebulous for determining whether a defendant
foreign state’s actions are clearly commercial in nature. 507 U.S. 349, 356-61 (1993).
See also Fed. Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., 12 F.3d 1270, 1278-79 (3d Cir. 1993)
(delineating a two-part test to determine whether a foreign state’s commercial
activities are sufficient to deprive it of sovereign immunity under the commercial
activity exception of the FSIA). The court in Federal Insurance Co. found that the
“initial inquiry is whether there is a sufficient jurisdictional connection or nexus
between the commercial activity and the United States; and the second inquiry is
whether there exists a substantive connection or nexus between the commercial
activity and the subject matter of the cause of action.” Id.  See also Paterson, Zochonis
(U.K.) Ltd. v. Compania United Arrow, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 621, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(enunciating that, “in order for the [commercial activity exception of the FSIA] to
apply . . . suit must be based either upon the commercial activity of a foreign state
carried on in the United States, an act performed in the United States by a foreign
state in connection with its commercial activity elsewhere or a commercial act of a
foreign state outside the United States which causes a ‘direct effect’ in the United
States”).
205. Examples of commercial activities in the legislative history of the Act include,
“[a]ctivities such as foreign government’s sale of a service or a product, its leasing of
property, its borrowing of money, its employment or engagement of laborers, clerical
staff or public relations or marketing agents, or its investment in a security of an
American corporation.”  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6616 [hereinafter House Report].
206. See Comment, “Commercial Activity” Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976: Toward a More Practical Definition, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 295, 300-02 (1982)
(commenting on the fact that the determination of whether an act is commercial or
governmental is left up to the judiciary).
207. See infra notes 208-22 and accompanying text (analyzing the differences
between a purely commercial and purely governmental activity).
208. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (indicating that when
determining whether an activity is commercial in nature, reference should be made
to its nature as opposed to its purpose).
209. See infra note 212 and accompanying text (providing judicial precedent
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purpose test, if the reason underlying the government’s activities
relates to a given sovereign obligation, then that government retains
immunity.210 Conversely, the nature test211 ignores the underlying
reason, looking only to the nature of the transaction.212
The FSIA expressly adopts the nature test, but the “key to a
definition of “nature” for FSIA analysis, then, requires a distinction
between the legal nature of private acts and the legal nature of
governmental acts.”213  The benchmark case of Texas Trading & Milling
Corp. v. Republic of Nigeria214 illustrates how courts have interpreted the
commercial nature of an activity.215  The Second Circuit found, “if the
activity is one in which a private person could engage, the sovereign is
not entitled to immunity.”216  Under this so-called private person
test,217 if a private party has the legal right and power to engage in the
same activity or commit the same act, the act or activity is

distinguishing between the nature and the purpose of a commercial activity).
210. See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R.
11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov’t Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 27 (1976) (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of
State).
211. The nature test has been described as:
The distinction between acts [that have a public purpose] and acts [that
have a private purpose] can only be based on the nature of the act of the
State or of the resulting legal relation, not on the motive or the purpose of
the activity.  What is relevant is whether the foreign State acted in the
exercise of its sovereign power.
Exemptions from Territorial Jurisdiction: Sovereign Immunity: 6 WHITEMAN DIGEST
§ 20, at 567.
212. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 708-09 (9th Cir.
1992) (discussing the differences of the nature and purpose of a foreign states’
activities).  The nature of an activity is essentially the superficial make-up of what has
been done.  When examining the nature of an activity, there is no reference to why
the act has been done, but only to the mere fact that it has been done. Id.  The
purpose, on the other hand, does in fact look to why an act has been done, as well as
its core rationale.  Id.  The Weltover Court discussed the differences between nature
and purpose of the commercial character of an act.  See also Republic of Arg. v.
Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614-17 (1992).  The Court defined “nature” as the outward
form of the conduct and “purpose” as the reason why the foreign state engages in the
conduct.  Id.
213. Steven H. Thomas, Note, Two Faces of The Trader: Guidelines for Distinguishing
Between Governmental and Commercial Acts Under The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 23 TEX. INT’L L.J. 465, 475 (1988) (noting what needs to be examined when
distinguishing between the nature of a governmental activity and a commercial
activity).
214. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
215. See id. at 308 (“If ‘commercial activity’ under § 1603(d) [of the FSIA] is
present, and if it bears the relation to the United States required by § 1605(a)(2),
then the foreign state ‘is not entitled to immunity’ . . . .”).
216. Id. at 309.
217. See id. (noting that an act is not entitled to immunity if it can be engaged in
by a private person); see also Joseph v. Office of Consulate Gen. of Nig., 830 F.2d
1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying the “private person test” set forth in Texas
Trading).
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commercial.218 If only a sovereign could commit the act or activity, it
is considered governmental in nature.219
Each of the foregoing principles have yet to be compiled into a
single test, and courts are still left with the painstaking task of
deciding whether a sovereign’s acts are commercial or governmental
in nature.220  The Justice Department’s Antitrust Guide for International
Operations221 notes that distinguishing between “sovereign” and
“commercial” activities may be difficult and “may turn in part on
questions of foreign law, custom, and practice.”222

218. See Tex. Trading & Mill Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 300 (2d
Cir. 1981).  The Texas Trading court instituted and applied the private party test to
deny immunity to the Nigerian government. Id.  The context of the case included
money damages stemming from a contractual obligation to pay. Id. at 302. By
refusing to uphold its contractual promises to pay, the Nigerian government caused
pecuniary damage to all of the cement suppliers involved. Id. at 302.  Nigeria’s
reasons for entering into or breaching the contracts are irrelevant, as are all of the
other contractual provisions. Id. at 310.  The money damages resulted from Nigeria’s
breach of a specific contractual provision and, because a private party would possess
the legal right and power to bind itself similarly, Nigeria’s activities were deemed
commercial.  Id. at 307-10; See also M. Mofidi, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and
the “Commercial Activity” Exception: The Gulf Between Theory and Practice, 5 J. INT’L LEGAL
STUD. 95, 104-05 (1999) (describing the application of the “private person” test).  See
generally In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982), vacated, 610 F. Supp. 306
(S.D. Tex. 1984), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Sedco, Inc. v. PEMEX, 767 F.2d
1140 (5th Cir. 1985)(finding that commercial damages include personal injury to
residents and businesses along the Texas—Louisiana coastline). Because a private
person would possess the legal right and power to drill an oil well, Pemex should not
receive immunity under the FSIA.  See id. at 565-66; see also Republic of Arg. v.
Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) (concluding when a foreign government acts a
like private player in the market, its actions are commercial).  The Weltover Court
used a “private person” test, asking whether a private person could engage in the
commerce the claim is based on. See id. at 613-14 (analogizing a foreign state to a
private person to make a commercial activity determination); see also Schoenberg v.
Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 930 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding an
activity to be commercial if it normally is undertaken for profit and if the sovereign is
not the only party capable of undertaking the activity); Rodriguez v. Republic of
Costa Rica, 934 F. Supp. 493, 497 (D. P.R. 1996) (holding that under the commercial
activity exception to sovereign immunity, an activity is commercial in nature if a
private actor could take part in that type of activity).
219. See Thomas, supra note 213, at 475 (characterizing the difference between
acts committed by private persons and acts committed by governments of foreign
states).
220. See generally Stella Havkin, Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The
Relationship Between the Commercial Activity Exception and the Noncommercial Tort Exception
in Light of De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 10 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 455 (1987) (providing an exposé on the differences between governmental and
commercial activities of foreign nations).
221. ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS (Jan. 26, 1977), reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. NO. 799,
(BNA) E-1 (Feb. 1, 1977) [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDE].
222. Id. at E-8 n.21.
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B. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine, a further limitation on jurisdictional
immunity, is a court-imposed restraint encompassing the basic rule of
customary international law that one country should not inquire into
the validity of “governmental”223 acts of a foreign sovereign within its
own territory.224  The doctrine recognizes the legal and physical
consequences of all acts of state in other countries, acknowledging
that the world is made up of independent sovereigns that possess
exclusive power to govern by their own laws or decrees within their
own national territorial boundaries.225
The Supreme Court first recognized the act of state doctrine as a
limiting factor in assertions of jurisdiction in Underhill v. Hernandez.226
The Court found that “[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one

223. See Conn, supra note 154, at 157 (elucidating the concept of a
“governmental” activity).  Conn writes:
[t]he applicability of the act of state doctrine depends on the nature of the
foreign state action and on the extent to which essentially private restraints
can be distinguished from private conduct that falls under the protective
umbrella of government policy.  This classification depends in part on
whether the state’s activities can be characterized as ‘governmental’ as
opposed to commercial.
Id.  In Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, a plurality opinion, the Court found
that the Cuban government’s refusal to repay mistakenly paid funds does not
constitute an act of state or indicate that the intervenors had governmental, as
opposed to merely commercial, authority for the refusal. See 425 U.S. 682, 683
(1976).  It should be noted that because this portion of the opinion was excluded
from Justice Powell’s concurrence and was rejected by the four dissenters, it is not
binding Supreme Court precedent.  See id. at 683. Given the analogous rationales
underlying the concepts of sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine, it
should therefore follow that when the act of state doctrine is applied to certain acts
of foreign states, the application of sovereign immunity should produce the same
results.  See id. at 683. If the defendant foreign state was denied sovereign immunity
on the grounds that its action was commercial in nature, it would be inconsistent to
grant the same immunity by applying the act of state doctrine. See id.  Taking this
approach would undeniably impede on the FSIA’s intention of making purely
commercial actions justiciable.  Id. at 700-06.  Cf. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 221, at
55 (taking the position that the act of state doctrine does not apply to the
“commercial” actions of a foreign government or instrumentality).
224. The act of state doctrine differs from the sovereign immunity defense in that
the latter involves the exemption of a party from suit because of its status, whereas,
the former is merely a choice of law question, i.e., a U.S. court will accept the validity
of a law of a foreign state in reviewing conduct of the foreign sovereign which
occurred within its own territory.  See Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 705-06 n.18.
225. See Ifeanyi Achebe, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976: Can they Coexist?, 13 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 247, 251 (1989) (noting that the
act of state doctrine is “a principal of judicial restraint, essentially to prevent
disrespect for foreign states).  The policy underlying the act of state doctrine is that
courts should abstain from actions that hinders the executive branch in conducting
foreign relations and that might imperil harmonious relations with other nations.
See 45 AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 51 (1999) (proffering that courts should refrain
from engaging in actions that might strain amicable relations with other nations).
226. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory.”227  In 1964, in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino,228 the Court revisited Underhill and intervening
cases, and in its decision, added the “Judicial Branch will not examine
the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign
sovereign government, [subject to certain possible limitations].”229
In deciding cases such as Sabbatino, the Court’s purpose is two-fold.
First, the Court seeks to emphasize constitutional issues that relate to
the separation of powers between the judicial and political branches
of government on matters of foreign affairs.230  Second, the Court
endeavors to consider the notion of comity with respect to the
applicability of the act of state doctrine, as declared in Timberlane.231
In sum, the act of state doctrine does not establish an exception for
cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign governments.232
Instead, it necessitates that, in the process of deciding whether an act
is governmental or commercial, the purely governmental actions of
foreign states, undertaken within their own jurisdictions, shall be
deemed valid.233

227. Id. at 252.  The plaintiff in Underhill sought to recover damages for tortious
acts committed by the commander of a revolutionary army in Venezuela.  See id. at
250-51.  These acts allegedly had transpired during an insurgent overthrow of the
Venezuelan government. Id.  The plaintiff alleged a clear economic impact for which
United States law offered remedy, yet because the United States officially recognized
the defendant’s revolutionary party, the defendant’s conduct represented acts of a
sovereign nation occurring within its own borders. Id. at 254. Consequently, the
United States did not “sit in judgment” on the acts committed by the defendant. Id.
228. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
229. Id. at 428 (balancing considerations to be taken into account when
determining which political branch is most suited to handle issues dealing with
foreign relations).
230. See generally Russ Schlossbach, Note, Arguably Commercial, Ergo Adjudicable?: The
Validity of a Commercial Activity Exception To the Act of State Doctrine, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J.
139, 160 (2000) (finding that a case-by-case analysis is appropriate when dealing with
the prudential question of whether a court should adjudicate a case “where sensitive
international policy issues are at stake”).  Justice Harlan suggests that the act of state
doctrine offers a means of appreciating constitutional separation of powers issues,
and notes that a grant of jurisdiction despite the Executive’s determination to forgo
a suit may offend separation of powers.  See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432-33.
231. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 615-16 (9th Cir.
1976) (weighing international comity interests against those interests that a
jurisdiction-seeking nation may have in “providing the means of adjudicating
disputes or claims that rise within its territory”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41 (1965)); see also supra text
accompanying notes 134-36 (discussing the rationale behind adherence to the
notion of international comity).
232. See generally Achebe, supra note 225, at 251-52 (recognizing the true function
and purpose of the act of state doctrine).
233. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405-06
(1990) (enunciating that the act of state doctrine only applies in cases where to
adjudicate “would have required a court in the United States to declare invalid the
official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory”).
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IV. CAN U.S. ANTITRUST LAW BE APPLIED EXTRATERRITORIALLY TO
ASSERT JURISDICTION OVER OPEC?
Abolition of the foregoing jurisprudential hurdles to the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law may be a lofty and
seemingly unrealistic goal.  However, given the current global
economy, there is a need for effective transitional enforcement of
U.S. antitrust law.234  Yet, actions of foreign sovereigns not falling
within the purview of the aforementioned exceptions to subjection of
U.S. antitrust law remain immune from suit.  Given that, this
Comment shall now focus on the issue at hand:  should current laws
be altered so as to quash the safeguards protecting OPEC from being
subject to antitrust prosecution in the United States?
A. The First and Final Attempt at Taking Action Against OPEC:
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v. OPEC
In 1979, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers (“IAM”), an American labor union, brought an antitrust
action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
challenging the price-fixing activities235 of OPEC and its then thirteen
member nations, naming each nation and OPEC as defendants.236
IAM sought monetary and injunctive relief for alleged price fixing of
crude oil in violation of the Sherman Act.237  The actual injury
plaintiffs alleged was the payment of exorbitant prices for gasoline at
station pumps, by virtue of the anti-competitive actions taken by
OPEC and the antitrust violations involved.238  The district court,
however, denied jurisdiction on the grounds that the suit against

234. See WORLD ANTITRUST LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL FOR
LAWYERS AND BUSINESS 7:50 (James J. Garrett ed., 1997) (stating that the day has
passed in which a company need be concerned only with the antitrust laws of its own
country).
235. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing the oil crises of the
1970s).
236. The defendants did not appear in the district court proceedings.  See Int’l
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries,
477 F. Supp. 553, 559-60 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th
Cir. 1981).  Their position was argued to the court by amici and additional
information was supplied by court appointed experts.  See id.  At the time of this
lawsuit, Gabon and Ecuador were members of OPEC.  See id. at 558-59.  However,
Ecuador, in 1992, and Gabon, in 1995, withdrew their membership, consequently
leaving OPEC with its current eleven member nations.
237. See IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 558.  The plaintiffs alleged that these price
setting activities violated Section One of the Sherman Act, under which price-fixing
has been a per se violation.  See id.
238. See id. at 559 (stating the causes of action for which the plaintiffs brought
suit).
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OPEC and its member nations was barred by sovereign immunity.239
Central to the district court’s judgment was its finding that OPEC’s
alleged price fixing was a governmental rather than commercial act.240
The court held that OPEC’s purpose in setting oil prices was to
ensure control of the member nations’ natural resources, a sovereign
function.241  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
dismissal of the suit but on different grounds.242  While not deciding
the issue of whether OPEC enjoys sovereign immunity, the Ninth
Circuit instead held the act of state doctrine barred jurisdiction.243
The court noted its holding was motivated by an unwillingness to rule
on delicate matters of foreign policy, especially where the executive
and legislative branches have chosen to approach a given case with
restraint.244

239. Id. at 565-70 (insisting that OPEC’s actions fell within the purview of those
actions allowable by a sovereign nation).  The district court’s resounding
determination that OPEC’s acts are purely governmental is not without its faults.  See
id.
240. See id. at 566-67 (acknowledging that while the standards of the FSIA are
nebulous, the nature of the activity in which OPEC and its member-nations engaged
is the only one in which a sovereign can engage).
241. See IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 567 (finding that “the establishment by a
sovereign state of the terms and conditions for the removal of a prime natural
resource to wit, crude oil from its territory” is essentially a governmental function).
The court found that a sovereign has the sole power to control its natural resources.
See id.  The court also noted that OPEC’s control over their oil resources “is a
sovereign function because oil, as their primary, if not sole, revenue producing
resources,” is vital to the well-being of their nations’ peoples.  Id. at 568.
242. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. of Petroleum
Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
243. See id.  The Ninth Circuit found that OPEC qualified for act of state
protection for two reasons: first the court said, “certain seemingly commercial activity
will trigger act of state considerations” when they possess “a significant sovereign
component;” second, the court concluded that, given the importance of oil in
international relations, and the far-reaching attention given to this issue by the
executive and legislative branches, it would be imprudent for the court to accept
jurisdiction over the case.  Id. at 1360-61.
244. See id. at 1361-62 (deciding that the court is not the appropriate branch of
government to consider such sensitive areas as judging the legality of an act of a
foreign state). But see Douglas H. Meal & Joel P. Trachtman, Comment, Defenses to
Actions Against Foreign States Under the United States Antitrust Laws, 20 HARV. INT’L L.J.
583, 648 (1979) (asserting that while an executive suggestion likely would hold more
weight than that of the judiciary, with respect to actions under act of state scrutiny,
this “does not mean that it would override other[] [suggestions] which might
outweigh them in a given case”).  By formulating a per se rule that would make
executive suggestions dispositive clearly would be contrary to the act of state
doctrine’s goal of protecting against the embarrassment of deciding upon an issue
that should be left up to a different branch of government to resolve.  See id.  To
make this decision by utilizing a balancing test is much more desirable than making
the executive suggestion dispositive.  See id. at 649.
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B. Why OPEC Should Not Retain Sovereign Immunity
At the district court level in IAM v. OPEC, Judge Hauk saw the
problem as deciding whether OPEC’s acts were commercial acts in
the marketing and selling of oil, or as governmental acts with respect
to setting terms of the removal of a major natural resource from the
member-nations’ territory.245  Judge Hauk’s rationale,246 however, was
flawed, and appropriately criticized by the Ninth Circuit.247  The
central question in IAM v. OPEC was whether a foreign state was
immune from commercial conduct in exercising sovereignty over its
natural resources.248  The following presents the tension between
OPEC’s governmental and commercial capacities.
It is seemingly a governmental activity for foreign nations to
regulate the extraction of petroleum from its own terrain by ensuring
compliance with zoning, environmental, and other regulatory
establishments.249  However, by sitting together in collusion to limit

245. See IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 567 (deciding that the issue at bar was
whether extraction of natural resources was a sovereign right); see also Mark B.
Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspective: A
Founder’s View, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 308 (1986) (assessing what constitutes
commercial as opposed to governmental activities).  The portion of the commercial
activity exception most applicable to extraterritorial cartel activities that withholds
sovereign immunity, is when the relevant government conduct takes place “outside
the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and th[ose] act[s] cause[] a direct effect in the United
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  This phrase, the third
clause of the commercial activities exception, provides an exclusive basis for
jurisdiction when the commercial activity involves only the slightest contact with the
United States; the contact need not be substantial.  See id.
246. See E.C. Lashbrook, Jr., Vertical Integration and Restraints by the Oil Producing
Sovereigns: Antitrust Implications and Supply Considerations, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
193, 207-09 (1980) (explaining the rationale behind Judge Hauk’s opinion).  Judge
Hauk recognized that the FSIA provides no guidance for coming to a decision on the
issue of whether OPEC should possess sovereign immunity.  See IAM v. OPEC, 477 F.
Supp. at 567-69.  He referred to various resolutions and declarations from the United
Nations affirming each state’s “permanent sovereignty” over its natural resources.  See
id.  He also was persuaded by the fact that the foreign states’ were dependent
financially on the capital the oil brought to their nation.  See id.
247. The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by the reasoning of Judge Hauk.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the holding that the foreign states were involved in
noncommercial acts merely by finding that when dealing with an act of a foreign
state that is neither definitively governmental nor definitively commercial, the act
must be viewed in light of its nature (the act itself) rather than its purpose (the
underlying impetus), as instructed by the FSIA.  See IAM v. OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1357-
58.  However, that court failed to make a judgment on that issue, and dismissed the
case on other grounds.  See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text (stating the
rationale and holding of the Ninth Circuit in IAM v. OPEC).
248. Receipt of the revenues as profit from oil sales, rather than as taxes or
royalties, seems more suggestive of their nature than the degree of fiscal dependence
of the foreign state on the revenues.  See David A. Brittenham, Note, Foreign Sovereign
Immunity and Commercial Activity: A Conflicts Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1440, 1487
(1983).
249. See generally Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources,
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their oil production with the overriding goal of increasing prices,
OPEC and its member nations are engaging in a commercial
activity.250  The district court, when confronted with the contentions
in the complaint that “these governments went on national television
and announced they were fixing prices—a per se violation of the
antitrust laws,”251 in effect said, “[n]o, no[, y]ou forgot about the
sovereign immunity defense.  These are sovereigns, and they are
immune because the activity they were engaging in was the
preservation and maximization of profit from natural resources, a
clearly sovereign activity.  Therefore, they are immune.”252  These
statements further substantiate the flaw of the district court’s
decision.  The FSIA provides instructions to look at the nature of the

G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 17 at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).  This
resolution recognizes “the inalienable right of all States freely to dispose of their
natural wealth and resources in accordance with their national interests, and  . . .
respect for the economic independence of States . . . .”  Id.
250. See IAM v. OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1357-61.  OPEC’s argument, at the district court
level can be reduced to a tripartite analysis: First, a government’s power to control
the development and extraction of its natural resources is an inherent element of a
foreign state’s sovereignty.  See id.  Second, specifying oil production levels as well as
the prices at which the oil is set is an exercise of sovereign power, and hence
governmental in nature.  See id.  Third, the governmental nature of setting prices and
production levels does not expire when carried out collusively with other foreign
states.  See id.  The first assertion is not being challenged here.  OPEC’s second
assertion fails to take into account that the means by which their first assertion is
carried out, that is, the decisions underlying the levels at which prices and
production are set, can be judged commercial.  OPEC’s third assertion is altogether
faulty as it falls short of recognizing the difference between the act of setting prices
and production levels and the act of cooperatively coordinating production and,
marketing strategies amongst all of its member-nations.  See IAM v. OPEC, 649 F.2d at
1357-61.  Even if price-fixing was not deemed a commercial activity, the
commerciality of OPEC’s acts still would be satisfied because of the close connection
between price-fixing and the sale of oil.  The legislative history behind the FSIA
explicitly defines the sale of a product as a commercial activity.  See House Report,
supra note 205, at 16.
251. Joseph P. Griffin, Special International Antitrust Doctrines and Defenses, 60
ANTITRUST L.J. 543, 548 (1991) (providing support for why OPEC could not claim
the sovereign immunity defense).
252. Id.  See also Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. Petroleum
Exporting Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553, 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d on other grounds,
649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).  But see MOL v. Bangladesh, 736 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th
Cir. 1984) (holding that the granting and revocation of a license to export a national
resource constituted a sovereign act, and consequently finding a lack of jurisdiction).
This case distinguished IAM v. OPEC, because in MOL, the defendant foreign state
had a contractual agreement whereby MOL was to utilize rhesus monkeys, the
natural resource in that case, for medical and other scientific research.  See id.  MOL
breached its agreement, allowing Bangladesh to cease exportation of the monkeys,
and MOL subsequently brought suit against Bangladesh.  See id. at 1327-28.  The suit
was dismissed eventually, and the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Bangladesh was
terminating an agreement that only a sovereign could have made.  See id. at 1329.
This agreement was not just a contract for trade of monkeys.  It concerned
Bangladesh’s right to regulate imports and exports, a sovereign privilege.  See id.  It
did not, however, as did OPEC, restrict trade and inflate prices—Bangladesh clearly
acted within its scope as a sovereign.  See id.
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activity, and not its purpose.253  The nature of OPEC’s conduct was
price-fixing, and, given OPEC’s overriding concern of serving its own
economic interests,254 it is indeed manifest that this conduct qualifies
as commercial under the FSIA.255
C. OPEC’s Actions Should Not be Deemed Acts of State
A principal reason for the soaring energy prices in the United
States is that international price-fixing has evaded review under U.S.
antitrust law.256  The underlying rationale for this inaction results
from foreign policy considerations and technical impediments in
antitrust laws that prevent the effective enforcement of U.S. law with
respect to international price-fixing in the energy market.257  Such
policy and technical impediments include the uncertain act of state
doctrine, “which has been used to bar a lawsuit directed at stopping
the manipulation of energy supplies and prices because of concern
that such litigation might interfere in the foreign policy of the United
States.”258
In IAM v. OPEC, the Ninth Circuit found that, notwithstanding the
undeniably commercial character of its price setting and production-
limiting activities, OPEC retained jurisdictional protection under the
act of state doctrine.259  This was the first time a federal court, while
recognizing the commercial nature of acts committed by a foreign
state, accepted the act of state defense and dismissed the claim.260

253. See supra note 199 (indicating that in examining a commercial activity,
reference must be made to its nature and not to its purpose).
254. See generally ALLEN, supra note 13, at xiii (explaining OPEC’s underlying
motive).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 208-12 (discussing the role of the nature
versus purpose test in determining a commercial activity); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603,
1605 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (defining commercial activity as a “regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.”).
256. See generally 146 CONG. REC. S1942 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2000) (statement of
Sen. Specter) (discussing the United States’ failed attempts at stopping international
price-fixing).
257. See Foreign Trust Busting Act, H.R. 4731, 106th Cong. (2000) (stating why
crude oil prices have swelled and why no action has been taken to thwart its
continuation).
258. Id.
259. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (maintaining that the act of state
doctrine barred jurisdictional assertion over OPEC).
260. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. Petroleum
Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The act of state doctrine
is not diluted by the commercial activity exception which limits the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. While purely commercial activity may not rise to the level of an
act of state, certain seemingly commercial activity will trigger act of state
considerations.”) (citation omitted).  Prior cases that had found a foreign state’s
activities to be commercial in nature, thus denying immunity from suit, also had
found that that the act of state doctrine was not intended to override these
considerations by relying on Congress’ goal in enacting the FSIA to prohibit the
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Moreover, as a general principle of asserting jurisdiction over a
foreign state, verification of immunity under the FSIA is a necessary
precursor to entertaining any other defenses.261  The Ninth Circuit
essentially deemed the act of state doctrine to be a rule of
“jurisdictional immunity or abstention.”262  Additionally, the act of
state doctrine typically extends to the acts of a foreign state that are
committed and have consequences within their own country.263  IAM
v. OPEC, conversely, expanded the act of state notion to include acts
that were not limited to its member nations’ borders, but extended to
countries to which it provided services.264
“Since the 9th Circuit issued its opinion in 1981, there have been
major developments in international law that impact directly on the
subject matter at issue.”265  The 1990s witnessed an increase in the
efforts to seek compliance with basic international norms of behavior

assertion of an act of state defense with respect to commercial activities.  See House
Report, supra note 205, at 20 n.1; see, e.g., Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp.,
621 F.2d 1371, 1380-81 (5th Cir. 1980) (maintaining that the act of state doctrine
does not preclude judicial resolution of all disputes arising out of a commercial
activity).
261. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see, e.g., Castillo v. Shipping
Corp. of India, 606 F. Supp. 497, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (determining that under the
FSIA, “the absence of sovereign immunity is essential for existence of subject matter
jurisdiction, which, in turn, is necessary for the attainment of personal jurisdiction”).
262. JOSEPH DELLAPENA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS
312 (1988) (proffering the possibility of the nullification of the commercial activity
test under the FSIA if the act of state doctrine is applied in such a way that,
commercial or not, the United States will abstain from scrutinizing such activities).
The Ninth Circuit attempted to substantiate its holding by referring to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).  See
IAM v. OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1359.  The Court in Sabbatino recommended that absent a
controlling international agreement binding both the United States and the Cuban
governments, U.S. courts may be permitted to assess the legitimacy of a foreign
state’s actions under international law.  IAM v. OPEC is quite different from
Sabbatino.  IAM v. OPEC dealt with a claim in which the act of a foreign sovereign
defendant violated domestic law, whereas Sabbatino, which dealt with the validity of
an act of a nonparty foreign state under international law, had no application in the
IAM v. OPEC decision.  Sabbatino focused on the applicable substantive law in a case
properly before a court having jurisdiction; IAM v. OPEC used the act of state
doctrine to preclude the exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction as opposed to deciding
the merits of the case.  See generally RICHARD A. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 409-17 (1970).
263. See William Harvey Reeves, The Sabbatino Case: The Supreme Court of the United
States Rejects a Proposed New Theory of Sovereign Relations and Restores the Act of State
Doctrine, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 631, 640-41 (1964) (stating that the act of state doctrine
is the recognition by a country of the legal and physical consequences of all acts of
state in other countries).
264. See Iraq v. First Nat’l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965) (finding that
United States courts are permitted to recognize the act of state doctrine “only if
[those acts] are consistent with the policy and law of the United States.”) (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 46 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962).
265. 146 CONG. REC. S1942-44 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Specter).
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through international courts and tribunals.266  Additionally, as a result
of the holding in Hartford Fire in 1993, the doctrine of international
comity, a fundamental ingredient of the act of state doctrine, has
been nullified.267  Given these considerations, a U.S. court electing to
apply the act of state doctrine to a suit taken against OPEC today will
most probably reach a different determination than reached by the
Ninth Circuit nearly twenty years ago.268
D. OPEC’s Actions Viewed in Light of the Effects Paradigms
As stated below, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Alcoa
formulated the two-pronged “effects” test in order to establish federal
jurisdiction over foreign companies.269  In its decision in Hartford Fire
in 1993, the Supreme Court based its decision in part on the “effects”
jurisdictional standard of the FTAIA, and examined whether the
conduct at issue had a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect” on U.S. commerce.270  In applying the prevailing law in the
United States in Hartford Fire to the actions undertaken by OPEC, the
conclusion that an action against OPEC is now possible becomes
more readily apparent.
Under the Hartford Fire two-step test, a court will first determine
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, requiring it
to consider whether the defendant intentionally caused substantial
effects upon the United States.271  OPEC openly manipulates the price

266. See id. (exemplifying his discussion with various suits adjudicated in
international forums).
267. See supra Part II.D (providing a commentary on the downfall of the usage of
international comity).
268. See 146 CONG. REC. S1942 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (noting the change in act of state applicability over past three decades); see
also Meal & Tractman, supra note 244 and accompanying text (suggesting a different
approach with respect to the usage of the act of state doctrine).
269. See supra notes 128-38 and accompanying text (discussing the “effects” test
and the international resentment over its application).
270. See In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 932-34 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); see also
supra note 70 and note 165 and accompanying text (providing a history of the
FTAIA).
271. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(B) (1994) (addressing the applicability of the FTAIA).
The House Judiciary Committee Report, however, indicates that the Act “does not
affect the legal standards for determining whether conduct violates the antitrust
laws.”  HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY TO THE FOREIGN
ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1982, H.R. REP. NO. 686, 97th Cong. 13 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498 [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
Considering OPEC’s massive control of the oil market, its impact on the U.S.
economy is both substantial and foreseeable and OPEC’s contacts with the United
States are sufficient to satisfy the personal jurisdiction requisites of the “direct effect”
provision.  See Terence J. Pell, Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Direct
Effects and Minimum Contacts, 14 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 97, 101-02 (1981) (examining the
“direct effect” provision of the FSIA).
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of oil, and it calculatedly keeps energy prices high enough to fund its
members’ own economies.272  However, it does not keep these prices
too high, so as to keep the United States “hooked” on oil and to keep
the United States from making renewable sources or other
alternatives economical.273  America’s devoted reliance on crude oil,
most notably in the form of gasoline, demonstrates how OPEC’s
actions have substantially affected a significant number of American
citizens.274  This is a manifest violation of U.S. antitrust law, and the
United States’ continued practice of excepting foreign states from its
antitrust law has led to the undesirable perception that U.S. courts
tolerate foreign anti-competitive conduct.
The second part of the Hartford Fire test declares that once a court
determines that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, it will
then consider whether it ought to exercise this jurisdiction in light of
principles of international comity.275  Recall that the Supreme Court
in Hartford Fire held that a U.S. court should not consider the
interests of a foreign sovereign unless there is a “true conflict”
between U.S. law and the law of the foreign state.276  There being no
battle of laws in the instant analysis, U.S. courts, under a Hartford Fire
analysis, need not concern themselves with comity considerations to
promote the dismantling of oil price-fixing arrangements between
the members of OPEC.  Decisions with respect to foreign relations
should be left to Congress and not the courts.277
The “effects” jurisdictional standard strikingly parallels the subject
matter jurisdiction component present in the “direct effect” provision
of the FSIA’s commercial activity exception.278  The FSIA criterion

272. See 146 CONG. REC. E1107-01 (daily ed. June 23, 2000) (extension of remarks
of Rep. Gilman) (pointing out that OPEC is keeping oil prices at exceedingly high
levels).
273. See id. (describing how OPEC ensures customer countries’ dependence on oil
by keeping prices from reaching heights at which customer countries would turn to
other forms of energy).
274. See 146 CONG. REC. E1585-03, 1586 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2000) (extension of
remarks of Rep. Gilman) (noting that gasoline is an indispensable commodity under
the virtual unilateral control of OPEC).
275. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 271, at 13 (discussing the implications of
comity on a determination of the appropriateness of jurisdictional assertion).  “If a
court determines that the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are met, [the
FTAIA] would have no effect on the court[’s] ability to employ notions of comity . . .
or otherwise to take account of the international character of the transaction.”  Id.
(citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)).
276. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of Hartford
Fire).
277. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign
Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395 (arguing that the legislature should have the
task of handling foreign relations).
278. See supra note 204 (asserting that for the commercial activity exception to
apply to the acts of foreign nations, such activities must have a “direct effect” on the
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likewise requires that the defendant foreign state’s activities have a
substantial and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce.279
Consequently, under the “effects” jurisdictional standard, OPEC
would fall under the realm of antitrust laws for the same reasons that
their actions have a “direct effect” on commerce in the United States.
E. Recent Legislation Favoring Legal Action Against OPEC
While not taking any official action, Congress has duly recognized
OPEC’s reprehensible conduct and has begun efforts to cope with
the serious problems resulting from the rise in the price of oil
stemming from the activities of OPEC and its member countries.280
With oil prices at record high levels, and rising toward forty dollars
per barrel, the United States’ passivity with respect to OPEC’s
activities must end.  The Clinton Administration’s failure to consider
amending the jurisprudential impediments has sent the clear signal
to OPEC that the United States will tolerate price-fixing.281  Moreover,
OPEC’s production quota not only hurts Americans financially, but
also comes at a time when total U.S. reserves are at a twenty-four year
low.282  The following legislation represents recent efforts taken by

United States); see also Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 107 F.3d 720, 726 (9th Cir.
1997) (finding that a foreign sovereign’s acts have “direct effect” in the United
States, within the meaning of the commercial activity exception of the FSIA, if the
effect follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant’s activity); United
World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass’n, 33 F.3d 1232, 1237-38 (10th
Cir. 1994) (asserting that under the “direct effect” exception to the FSIA, a foreign
state is not immune from suit in any case in which the action is based on an act
having taken place outside the United States in connection with the commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere if the act causes a direct effect in the United
States); Tex. Trading & Mill Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 307-11 (2d
Cir. 1981) (mandating that a determination of whether the effect of the act
complained of in an action against a foreign sovereign is sufficiently direct and
sufficiently within the United States for a U.S. court to exercise jurisdiction under
the FSIA, the court should consider whether the effects are felt in the United States
sufficiently that Congress would have wanted a U.S. court to hear the case).
279. See supra note 197 and note 204 and accompanying text (elaborating on the
tests that must be passed and the criteria necessary for the assertion of jurisdiction
over a foreign state).
280. See infra Parts IV.E.1-4 (discussing legislation proposing the abolishment of
the legal impediments to bringing suit against OPEC).
281. See Press Release, House International Relations Committee, “Oil Producers
in Clover While Our Consumers are in Hock,” Gilman Tells Richardson (June 27,
2000), available at http://www/house.gov/international_relations/press/106sec/
62prjun27.html (noting the Administration’s passivity with respect to OPEC’s
“continued assault on [the United States’] free market system and antitrust
norms . . .”).
282. See Energy Information Administration, OPEC Fact Sheet: Background, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/opec.html (last modified Oct. 6, 2000)
(providing information obtained in a study by the EIA where U.S. oil reserves were
found to have decreased significantly from 1.63 million barrels to 1.53 million barrels
in under a year).
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Congress to end the detrimental effect that OPEC’s unfettered
domination over the world oil market is having on the United States.
1. The Foreign Trust Busting Act
U.S. Representative Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), Chairman of the
House International Relations Committee, is arguably the most vocal
member of Congress with respect to taking action against OPEC.283
On June 23, 2000,284 Rep. Gilman introduced the Foreign Trust
Busting Act (“FTBA”).285  The FTBA would allow lawsuits to be
brought against foreign energy cartels, where previously courts had
dismissed these lawsuits based on the act of state doctrine.286  Rep.
Gilman contended that tearing down the act of state barrier “would
not upset [U.S.] foreign relations if such a case proceeded, and if it
did, it would be worth it, given the potential that the enforcement of
antitrust laws would have in busting up OPEC.”287
2. International Energy Fair Pricing Act of 2000
In addition to the FTBA, Rep. Gilman introduced the International
Energy Fair Pricing Act of 2000 (“IEFPA”).288  “With the enactment of

283. See discussion infra pp. 33-36 (identifying Rep. Gilman as a major proponent
of passing new legislation which attempts to apply legal pressure on OPEC and its
members so as to force them to lessen their control over the international oil
market).
284. Rep. Gilman introduced this bill on June 23, 2000, which was subsequently
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and to the Committee on International
Relations, for a period to be determined by the Speaker.  Foreign Trust Busting Act,
H.R. 4731, 106th Cong. (2000).  At the writing of this Comment, the 106th Congress
was in session and no official determination had been made regarding this Act.  Rep.
Gilman does in fact intend on reintroducing this bill in the 107th Congress.
Telephone Interview with Matthew Horn, Legislative Assistant for the Honorable
Benjamin Gilman (July 19, 2001).
285. Id.  The purposes of this bill are:
to establish that the foreign policy interest of the United States would be
advanced, rather than impeded or complicated, if foreign entities, including
foreign cartels and foreign countries participating in such cartels, were held
responsible for energy supply and price manipulation that affects the United
States economy; and to eliminate barriers to the effective application of
United States antitrust laws to foreign entities that have manipulated energy
supplies or prices.
H.R. 4731 § 3.
286. Enacting this bill would amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide
that it is not contrary to U.S. foreign policy interest to bring an antitrust lawsuit
asserting the manipulation of energy supplies or prices, and for other purposes.  See
H.R. 4731 (amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961).
287. 146 CONG. REC. E1107-01 (daily ed. June 23, 2000) (extension of remarks of
Rep. Gilman).
288. International Energy Fair Pricing Act of 2000, H.R. 4732, 106th Cong.
(2000).  Rep. Gilman introduced this bill on June 23, 2000; it then was referred to
the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Banking and
Financial Services, for a period to be determined subsequently by the Speaker.  At
the writing of this Comment, the 106th Congress was in session and no official
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this measure, the Administration will no longer be able to . . .
[tolerate] cartel-like behavior.”289  The IEFPA instructs the President
to make a systematic review of his administration’s policies as well as
those of all international organizations and international financial
institutions, such as the IMF or World Bank, to guarantee that they
are not in any way fostering the oil price fixing activities,290 policies
and programs of OPEC.291  If such organizations are found to be
promoting the fixing of oil prices by OPEC, their U.S. representatives
will oppose any loan, project, program, or financial assistance to any
country that supports OPEC activities.292
3. Oil Price Reduction Act of 2000
Prior to introducing the FTBA and the IEFPA, Rep. Gilman
proposed to introduce the Oil Price Reduction Act of 2000 (“OPRA”)
in the House Committee on International Relations.293  In testimony
before the Committee, Clinton Administration officials asserted that
OPEC has restricted oil supplies to the market, thereby swelling
prices, and further maintained that OPEC’s activities as a cartel are
not in the national interests of the United States.294  The objective of
the OPRA is to reduce, suspend, or terminate assistance under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961295 and the Arms Export Control Act296

determination had been made regarding the IEFPA. Rep. Gilman does, however,
have definite intentions on reintroducing this bill in the 107th Congress.  Telephone
Interview with Mathew Horn, Legislative Assistant for the Honorable Benjamin
Gilman (July 19, 2001).
289. 146 CONG. REC. H1103-01 (daily ed. June 23, 2000) (extension of remarks of
Rep. Gilman).
290. The term “oil price-fixing” is defined as “participation in any agreement,
arrangement, or understanding with other countries that are oil exporters to
increase the price of oil or natural gas by means of, inter alia, limiting oil or gas
production or establishing minimum prices for oil or gas.”  H.R. 4732 § (7)(2).
291. See 146 CONG. REC. H1585-03 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2000) (extension of remarks
of Rep. Gilman) (prefacing the text of H.R. 4732).  This program would require the
Administration to initiate a policy review of the extent to which international
organizations recognize and or support OPEC and to take this relationship into
account assessing the importance of the United States’ relationship to these
organizations.  It would set up a similar review of the programs and polices of the
Agency for International Development to ensure that this agency has not indirectly
or inadvertently supported OPEC’s policies and programs.  See id.
292. See 146 CONG. REC. H1103-01 (daily ed. June 23, 2000) (extension of remarks
of Rep. Gilman) (listing the goals of the International Energy Fair Pricing Act).
293. Oil Price Reduction Act of 2000, H.R. 3822, 106th Cong. (2000).  This Act
was adopted by the House International Relations Committee on March 15, 2000,
and passed the House on March 22, 2000.  As of the writing of this comment, this bill
had not yet been reintroduced in the 107th Congress.
294. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-528, at 5 (2000) (describing the impetus for the
proposal of the Oil Price Reduction Act).
295. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2431k).
296. Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 87-297, 75 Stat. 631 (codified as
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to any country determined by the President to be engaged in oil
price-fixing to the detriment of the U.S. economy.297  If the President
concludes that OPEC members or other major non-OPEC oil
producers298 are involved in price-fixing, he must undertake a
concerted bilateral and multilateral diplomatic campaign to bring
about the termination of oil price-fixing arrangements.299
4. NOPEC
Congress’ most recent attempt to resolve the U.S. oil dilemma with
OPEC includes a proposal to amend the Sherman Act to make oil-
producing and exporting cartels illegal.300  The “No Oil Producing
and Exporting Cartels Act of 2000” (“NOPEC”),301  if enacted, would
destroy all jurisprudential barriers to asserting jurisdiction over
OPEC,302 and would establish a bright–line rule for extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law to actions of foreign states.303

amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2551-2595c).
297. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-528, at 1 (stating the purpose of the Oil Price
Reduction Act of 2000).  The Oil Price Reduction Act requires that “[n]ot later than
thirty days after enactment, the President shall report on the overall relationship [of
the United States] with each country that is a major oil exporter, shall describe the
nature of the coordination between these countries in regard to the effect that oil
pricing and production has had on the U.S. economy,” and provide a comprehensive
review of options available to the President as part of the multilateral effort including
the suspension, termination or reduction of assistance or arms sales to these same
countries.  See id. at 5-6.
298. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (providing information on non-
OPEC oil producers).
299. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-528, at 5 (describing the proposed diplomatic efforts to
be undertaken by the President in an effort to end price-fixing by any oil-exporting
or oil-producing nation).
300. See infra note 301 (noting that passage of NOPEC would make OPEC’s
agreement to restrict oil supply illegal under U.S. law and would allow the Attorney
General or the Federal Trade Commission to redress the problem by filing suit).
301. No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act of 2000, S. 665, 107th Cong.
(2001).  NOPEC would, “for the first time, establish, clearly and plainly, that when a
group of competing oil producers like OPEC agrees to act together to restrict supply
or set prices they are violating U.S. law, and [NOPEC] will authorize the Attorney
General or FTC to file suit under the antitrust laws for redress.”  See 147 CONG. REC.
S3216-01 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kohl).  NOPEC was originally
introduced in the Senate by Sen. Kohl as S. 2778, and in the House by Rep. Chabot
as H.R. 5241, both during the second session of the 106th Congress.  NOPEC was
reintroduced in the Senate by Sen. Kohl during the 1st session of the 107th Congress
as S. 665.
302. Such jurisprudential barriers include the act of state doctrine and sovereign
immunity.  See generally 146 CONG. REC. S5663-02, 5683 (daily ed. June 22, 2000)
(statement of Sen. Kohl) (noting that with the passage of this Act, a suit against oil-
exporting and oil-producing cartels would be possible).
303. “The purpose of NOPEC is simple and straightforward. It makes clear that
U.S. enforcement agencies may bring antitrust enforcement actions against foreign
states which violate antitrust laws in the production and sale of oil and other
petroleum products, and . . . the courts have jurisdiction . . . to consider such cases.”
Id. at 5684 (statement of Sen. DeWine).
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NOPEC would make it illegal for any foreign state304 to act
collectively with any other foreign state or person305 to limit the
production of oil, natural gas or any other petroleum product; to set
or maintain the price of oil, natural gas or any other petroleum
product; or, to take action in restraint of trade of oil, natural gas or
any other petroleum product.306  NOPEC would also strip a foreign
state of its sovereign immunity if it engaged in any of the foregoing
activities,307 and would  nullify the foreboding act of state doctrine.308
Given the far-reaching nature of NOPEC, it is unlikely that its passage
will be met without significant modifications.309  Nonetheless, if
NOPEC is passed, virtually each and every prior hindrance to
asserting jurisdiction over OPEC would be surmounted.310
F. Recommendations
U.S. courts cannot prosecute foreign sovereigns, and as a result,
U.S. courts do not have authority to assert jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns.  OPEC and its member nations are ostensibly and
disconcertingly protected from prosecution under U.S. law,311 in that
they are protected from the assertion of jurisdiction over them by
U.S. courts.312  It is therefore vital to both the well-being of American
consumers and the U.S. economy that the foregoing legislation be

304. See supra note 173 (defining the term “foreign state” as used in the FSIA to
include political subdivisions of foreign states and agencies or instrumentalities of
foreign states).
305. See supra notes 70, 77 (defining the terms “person” and “persons” as
including corporations and associations for Sherman Act analysis).
306. See S. 665 § 2 (stating, in a proposed additional section to the Sherman Act,
that it would be illegal and a violation of the Sherman Act for oil-producing cartels to
limit production, set prices, or otherwise restrain trade of oil, natural gas, or
petroleum).  This proposed section of the bill would, if enacted, be inserted after
Section 7 of the Sherman Act, as Section 7A.  See S. 665 § 2 (stating that section 7A,
would be added after Section 7 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7).
307. See id. § 2 (proposing to include as section 7A(b) to the Sherman Act that
“[a] foreign state engaged in conduct in violation of [this Act] shall not be immune
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction or judgments of the
courts of the United States in any action brought to enforce this section.”).
308. See id. (proposing to include as section 7A(c) to the Sherman Act that “[n]o
court of the United States shall decline, based on the act of state doctrine, to make a
determination on the merits in an action brought under this section.”).
309. But see S. 665, 107th Cong. (2001) (reporting that no congressional
committee has suggested any amendments to NOPEC).
310. See, e.g., supra note 302 (maintaining that jurisdictional barriers, such as the
act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity, will be overcome by the passage of
NOPEC).
311. See supra Parts II.C, III (outlining the hindrances that must be surmounted in
order to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over OPEC).
312. See discussion supra Part IV.A (discussing precedent that currently bars a suit
against OPEC within U.S. borders).
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enacted.313  In addition, OPEC’s conspiracy to restrain trade is having
a tremendous effect on the United States.314
The U.S. government has authority to remove the legal barriers
protecting OPEC.315  Unlike the act of state doctrine, U.S. antitrust
law316 and the commercial activities exception to sovereign
immunity317 are applicable to actions against OPEC.318  Enacting the
aforementioned legislation, therefore, will facilitate invalidating these
jurisprudential obstacles to holding OPEC accountable.319  A cost-
benefit analysis including scrutinizing service of process of OPEC,320
and the consequences of asserting jurisdiction over OPEC321 proves
this point.
First, if OPEC could be subject to suit in the United States, results,
in the form of the alleviation of production quotas and price
decreases, may not be seen immediately.322  Service of process on
OPEC and its member countries would also be a rather daunting
task.323  Section 1608 of the FSIA324 provides authority for service on
foreign states.325  Service on OPEC, however, would prove a rather

313. See supra Part IV.E.1-4 (describing current legislation whose passage would
facilitate a lawsuit against OPEC).
314. See, e.g., Daniel T. Murphy, Moderating Antitrust Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act and the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
(Revised), 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 789 (1986) (noting that OPEC’s actions affect the
price of petroleum products sold in the United States); Gary D. Allison, Energy
Sectionalism: Economic Origins and Legal Responses, 38 SEV. L.J., 703, 712 (1984)
(explaining that OPEC’s activities have caused oil price and energy supply increases
in the United States).
315. See supra Parts II.D, IV.B, .C, .D, .E.1-4 (postulating that with the combination
of the disposal of comity analysis, a reinterpretation of the IAM v. OPEC decision,
and the passage of new legislation such as NOPEC, OPEC can be subject to suit in
the United States).
316. See supra Parts II.C.1-2, IV (explaining why U.S. antitrust law should be
employed extraterritorially).
317. See supra Parts III.A.1-2, IV.B (explaining that a foreign state can be subject to
suit in the United States if that foreign state engages in a commercial activity, one in
which a private person can engage).
318. See supra Parts III.B, IV.C (comparing the differences in law existing when
OPEC was last subject to suit and the current state of law to demonstrate why courts
today should bar application of the act of state doctrine).
319. See, e.g., supra note 302 and accompanying text (explaining that NOPEC will
destroy jurisprudential barriers preventing jurisdiction over OPEC).
320. See infra notes 322-29 and accompanying text (analyzing service of process on
OPEC).
321. See infra notes 322-25 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of
asserting jurisdiction over OPEC).
322. See infra text accompanying notes 323-29 (providing the procedural
hindrances, which may delay effectuating suit against OPEC).
323. See infra notes 326-29 and accompanying text (discussing why service of
process on OPEC is difficult).
324. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
325. See id. (providing the law on service, time to answer, and default in cases
against foreign entities in U.S. courts).  Section 1608 enumerates the general
requirements for effectuating services on foreign states or their agents and
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tedious procedure,326 because it would include effectuating service on
eleven countries as well as the organization itself.327  Moreover, these
foreign states, or the agents and instrumentalities associated
therewith, who will in turn be served, may protest the entire
proceeding,328 thereby generating a strain on U.S. foreign relations
with those states.329
Second, there will be consequences to asserting jurisdiction over
OPEC.  If suit is in fact brought against OPEC, and, assuming
arguendo, a judgment did not favor OPEC, it can be argued that more
harm than good would ensue.  The United States would be placing
itself at a diplomatic disadvantage with respect to OPEC and its
member nations,330 hence the act of state doctrine.331  Adjudicating
such a dispute may risk damaging international repercussions with
OPEC and its member-nations.332
These concerns, however, are merely speculative and present a
worst-case scenario.  On a more positive note, a suit against OPEC
would mandate that OPEC return to its normal operations, which
ceased almost two years ago, and hopefully result in more oil

instrumentalities: “Service in the courts of the United States . . . shall be made upon
a foreign state or political subdivision of a foreign state . . . .”  Id. at § 1608(a).
“Service on the courts of the United States . . . shall be made upon an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state . . . .”  Id. at § 1608(b).
326. See generally DELLAPENNA, supra note 262, at 113-23 (discussing the various
methods by which foreign states and their agents and instrumentalities can be
served, as well as the discretionary nature accompanying such service).  Coupled with
the length of service of process, prolonged litigation may run counter to the goals of
the entity seeking to bring suit against OPEC.  See Lionel Kestenbaum, Antitrust’s
“Extraterritorial” Jurisdiction: A Progress Report on the Balancing of Interests Test, 18 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 311, 342 (1982) (discussing the interests that must be weighed when
asserting extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction over a foreign entity).
327. See supra note 325 (providing 28 U.S.C. § 1608 as the relevant statute to
effectuate service of process on foreign states and their agents or instrumentalities).
328. See DELLAPENA, supra note 262, at 117-18 (postulating that a foreign state may
refuse to accept service as a protest against the proceeding or the service, and that
this type of protest occurs especially in politically sensitive cases).
329. See generally id. at 113-19 (discussing preferred methods of service on foreign
states and the effects of such service).
330. But see supra text accompanying note 287 (suggesting that the abolition of the
act of state doctrine would not harm the United States’ foreign relations).
331. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. Petroleum
Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing the long-term
effect of bringing suit against a foreign state, and thereby disregarding the act of
state doctrine).
332. See, e.g., Meal & Trachtman, supra note 244, at 652 (explaining that
adjudicating anticompetitive conduct by OPEC may result in greater harm to
American consumers if OPEC retaliated, and that adjudication would only remedy
an isolated harm at the expense of possible greater harm); ATWOOD & BREWSTER,
supra note 133, §2.17-.18 (evaluating American anticartel policy and its negative
effects on American business abroad and domestically); Kintner & Griffin, supra note
95, at 219-27 (discussing the concerns and controversy behind the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act).
UDINJCI.DOC 10/11/2001  2:06 PM
2001] SLAYING GOLIATH 1373
production and lower oil costs.333  This Comment suggests that
antitrust law can be used to force OPEC to change its policy in a way
that would allow OPEC to continue its profit making activities, but
without unreasonable monetary exploitation of the countries it
serves.
CONCLUSION
Oil prices today are higher than any time since the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait.334  OPEC’s cut in oil production in early 1999 coupled with its
augmentation in prices is now beginning to stunt U.S. economic
growth.335  Americans are spending significantly more of their income
on gasoline and other oil-related products than they were less than
two years ago.336
It is time for the United States to make a concerted effort to
combat this now seemingly curable problem.  The availability of
antitrust sanctions along with the disallowance of claiming the
defenses of sovereign immunity337 and the act of state doctrine,338
would permit U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction over OPEC, thereby
granting the means of potentially diminishing OPEC’s control over
the global oil market.339  OPEC is engaging in a commercial activity,
and is in patent violation of the Sherman Act for engaging in a
conspiracy to restrain trade.340  U.S. courts have an affirmative duty to
combat antitrust violations that materially affect U.S. commerce and
have a duty to protect U.S. citizens.341  U.S. courts should perform the
duties of their offices and take action against OPEC.342
This Comment urges U.S. courts to rethink their prior rulings and

333. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14, 56-57 (stating when and why OPEC
began its current cutback in oil production).
334. See supra note 54 (discussing the Middle East crises that have had an effect on
oil prices).
335. See Allison, supra note 314, at 712 (evaluating the effects of OPEC’s price-
fixing and production cutbacks on the U.S. economy, including oil price increases
and the market value of domestic energy supplies rising above competitive levels).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14 (discussing OPEC’s recent actions
and the effect it has taken on oil related products in the United States).
337. See supra Parts III.A, IV.B (outlining the requirements for retaining sovereign
immunity and why OPEC’s actions are in violation of those requirements).
338. See supra Parts III.B, IV.C (explaining the doctrine of the act of state and why
OPEC’s actions do not qualify for act of state protection).
339. See supra Part I.B (explaining OPEC’s impact and domination of the global
oil industry).
340. See supra note 70 (citing language from the Sherman Act that prohibits
restraints on free competition between commercial entities).
341. See Chung, supra note 152, at 412 (explaining the importance of antitrust
enforcement, whether it be enforcement on a domestic or an international scale).
342. See discussion supra pp. 1-2 (noting that OPEC’s current decrease in oil
production and increase in oil prices are helping directly to cause increases in
gasoline prices in the United States).
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Congress to adopt the aforementioned legislation, most specifically
NOPEC, in their present form.  This would allow a lawsuit to be
brought against OPEC.  The current criteria by which a suit against
OPEC would be judged are indeed limited.  Enacting new laws and
restructuring old ones would not only permit a suit against OPEC but
may begin a trend whereby other nations may follow suit and amend
their corresponding laws.  The laws of the United States are intended
to protect Americans, not international cartels.
